Performance Analysis of Authentication Protocols in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks by Aboobaker, Abdul Kalam Kunnel
Performance Analysis of
Authentication Protocols in Vehicular
Ad Hoc Networks (VANET)
Abdul Kalam Kunnel Aboobaker
Technical Report
RHUL–MA–2010–02
31st March 2010
Department of Mathematics
Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, England
http://www.rhul.ac.uk/mathematics/techreports
Performance Analysis of Authentication
Protocols in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANET)
Abdul Kalam Kunnel Aboobaker
Student Number: 100542563
Supervisor: Dr. Stephen Wolthusen
Submitted as a part of the requirements for the award of MSc in Information Security at
Royal Holloway, University of London.
I declare that this assignment is all my own work and that I have acknowledged all quotations
from the published or unpublished works of other people. I declare that I have also read
the statements on plagiarism in Section 1 of the Regulations Governing Examination and
Assessment Offences and in accordance with it I submit this project report as my own work.
Signature: Date: 02-09-2009
Contents
1 Introduction 12
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Purpose of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Content Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Background 15
2.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.1 Characteristics and Complexities of MANET . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.2 MANET Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 Application Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Challenges of VANET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.3 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.4 Communication Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.5 Radio System and Communication Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Identifying V2V Safety-Critical Applications 31
3.1 Application Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Creating Application List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Application Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.1 Pre-crash sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.2 Cooperative (forward) collision warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.3 Emergency electronic brake lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.4 Blind spot warning / Lane change warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4 Identifying Security and Performance Requirements 39
4.1 Security Challenges of VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.1 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.2 Attacks on VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 VANET Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.1 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.2 Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.3 Entity Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2
Contents
4.2.4 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.5 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.6 Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.7 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.8 Auditability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.9 Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Identifying Application Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Identifying Performance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5 Security Architecture for Selected Applications 50
5.1 Architecture Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1.1 Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1.2 Identification and Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.3 Hardware Security Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1.4 Authentication, Integrity and Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1.5 Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1.6 Privacy and Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1.7 Secure Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1.8 Secure Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1.9 Correctness of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2.1 Choice of Communication System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2.2 Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.3 Basic Safety Messaging Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.4 Traffic Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6 Performance Analysis of Authentication Protocols 62
6.1 Network Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2 Baseline Pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3 Group Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.4 Hybrid Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.5 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.5.1 Computation Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.5.2 Cryptographic Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.5.3 Total Message Size vs. Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.5.4 Total Message Size vs. Message Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.5.5 Messaging Rate vs. Processing Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.6 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3
Contents
7 Conclusion 75
7.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.1.1 Total Message Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.1.2 Message Processing Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.1.3 Message Delay: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.1.4 Performance Analysis: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.1.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.2 Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.2 Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.3 Sensor Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.4 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.5 Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.6 Data Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.7 Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.8 Non-Technical Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Bibliography 81
4
List of Figures
2.1 VANET System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 RSU extends communication range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 RSU acts as information source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 RSU providing internet access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 North American 5.9 GHz DSRC channel allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6 WAVE protocol stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 Frequency allocation in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8 C2C Communication System protocol stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Forgery attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5
List of Tables
2.1 MANET wireless technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 MANET applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 VANET application types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 VSCC safety applications list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 V2V safety-critical applications (Application requirements) . . . . . . . . 35
4.1 V2V safety-critical applications (Security requirements) . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.1 Traffic scenario parameters and values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.2 Signature algorithms - computation costs and overheads . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.3 Processing costs for authentication schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.4 Message size vs. System throughput for different authentication protocols 70
6.5 Message size vs. Message delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6
Abbreviations
AU Application Unit
BP Baseline Pseudonym
C2C-CC CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium
CA Certification Authority
CALM Continuous Communications Air Interface for Long and Medium Range
CAMP Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership
CICAS Cooperative Intersection Collision Avoidance System
COMeSafety Communication for eSafety
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DoS Denial of Service
DOT Department of Transportation
DRP Distributed Revocation Protocol
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ELP Electronic License Plate
ETC Electronic Toll Collection
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FCC Federal Communications Commission
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
7
List of Tables
GPS Global Positioning System
GS Group Signature
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
GTA Governmental Transportation Authority
HS Hybrid Signature
HSDPA High-Speed Downlink Packet Access
HSM Hardware Security Module
HT Hot Spots
I2V Infrastructure to Vehicle
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISO Intergnational Organisation for Standardisation
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
LTI Long Term Identity
MAC Medium Access Control
MANET Mobile Ad Hoc Network
OBU On Board Unit
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RCCRL Revocation protocol using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists
RSU Road Side Unit
RTPD Revocation protocol of the Tamper-proof Device
SEVECOM Secure Vehicle Communication
STI Short Term Identity
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
TPM Trusted Platform Module
8
List of Tables
TRH Tamper Resistant Hardware
TTL Time to Live
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
V2I Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V Vehicle to Vehicle
VANET Vehicular Ad Hoc Network
VC Vehicular Communication
VII Vehicle Infrastructure Integration
VIIC Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Consortium
WiMax Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
9
Acknowledgement
Sincere thanks to Dr. Stephen Wolthusen, my project supervisor, for his exceptional
guidance and support. His feedback was most valuable for the completion of this work.
Special thanks to my wife Sapna, for her help with the thesis, and for her unwavering
support to me and our family during my M.Sc. This work is dedicated to her.
10
Abstract
Traditionally traffic safety was addressed by traffic awareness and passive safety measures
like solid chassis, seat belts, air bags etc. With the recent breakthroughs in the domain
of mobile ad hoc networks, the concept of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) was reali-
sed. Safety messaging is the most important aspect of VANETs, where the passive safety
(accident readiness) in vehicles was reinforced with the idea of active safety (accident
prevention). In safety messaging vehicles will message each other over wireless media,
updating each other on traffic conditions and hazards. Security is an important aspect
of safety messaging, that aims to prevent participants spreading wrong information in
the network that are likely to cause mishaps.
Equally important is the fact that secure communication protocols should satisfy the
communication constraints of VANETs. VANETs are delay intolerant. Features like
high speeds, large network size, constant mobility etc. induce certain limitations in the
way messaging can be carried out in VANETs. This thesis studies the impact of total
message size on VANET messaging system performance, and conducts an analysis of
secure communication protocols to measure how they perform in a VANET messaging
system.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Traffic safety is a major challenge recognised by the major players in the automotive
industry and by many governments. According to [31], in 1999 alone 450,000 road acci-
dents were reported in Germany . During the same year, Europe reported three times
this number of accidents with fatalities of 42,000. Similar situations exist in other parts
of the world like United States [84]. More health care money is spent treating crash
victims than any other cause of illness [40]. Traffic delays continue to increase, wasting
many hours for peak time travellers. This has prompted the launch of various research
projects [65] around the world to primarily come up with solutions addressing the is-
sues of traffic safety and efficiency. Apart from traffic safety and efficiency, features like
internet access, entertainment, payment services and information updates into can be
integrated into vehicles to improve passenger comfort comfort.
Traffic incidents are often a result of the driver’s inability to assess quickly and cor-
rectly the driving situations. Normally a driver, has incomplete information about road
conditions, speed and location of vehicles around them, and is forced to make decisions
like breaking and lane changing without the benefit of whole data. Real time commu-
nication between vehicles or between vehicles and road-side infrastructure can improve
traffic safety and efficiency [84]. For example, if a vehicle needs to slow down due to an
accident ahead, it will broadcast warning messages to neighbouring vehicles. The vehicles
behind it will thus be warned before they actually see the accident, helping the drivers
react faster, thereby avoiding rear ending of vehicles. In another scenario, if vehicles can
transmit traffic congestion information to other vehicles in its range, it can help other
vehicles receiving the information to chose alternate routes and avoid traffic congestion.
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), an extension of mobile ad hoc networks (MA-
NET) [43], were developed with a view to enable real-time communication between mo-
bile nodes (either vehicles or road side infrastructure) over wireless links, primarily with
a view to enable traffic safety and efficiency. The communication between nodes in a
VANET face many unique challenges [80]. This is especially true for safety-critical appli-
cations like collision avoidance, pre-crash sensing, lane change etc [55]. Factors like high
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vehicle speeds, low signal latencies, varying topology, total message size, traffic density
etc induce challenges that makes conventional wireless technologies and protocols unsui-
table for VANETs [9, 55].
Apart from the performance challenges, there are security issues unique to VANETs
like authenticating message sender, verifying validity of message data (like vehicle po-
sition), providing node privacy with non-repudiation, certificate revocation, availability
etc. All these performance and security requirements contribute to make VANET safety
applications challenging unlike other wireless applications.
1.2 Purpose of Thesis
Security is an important aspect of safety communications in VANET. Since safety ap-
plications also have challenging performance requirements, it is essential that the secure
communication protocols also meet the performance requirements. The scope of this work
is limited to VANET applications that are safety-critical (2.2.1) and that involve direct
vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communications. In this thesis, safety-critical applications are
first defined, and an evaluation of secure communication protocols will is performed to
see how well they meet the security and performance requirements demanded by safety-
critical applications.
In a safety-critical application, the total message size is determined by message payload
and cryptographic overhead. The performance evaluation of authentication protocols
involves analysing the impact of total message size (and hence cryptographic overhead)
and messaging rates on message latency, channel throughput, and message processing
delay, and its implications on safety-critical applications and authentication protocols.
Also it is investigated if the authentication protocols address the security requirements
(authentication, privacy and auditability) of safety-critical applications.
1.3 Content Outline
Chapter 1 explains the motivation behind the thesis topic, as well as the purpose of this
thesis. Also, outlined are the contents of different chapters that forms the thesis. Initial
part of Chapter 2 does a brief review of MANETs and the latter part specifically dwells
on the applications, characteristics, and technologies associated with VANETs. In chap-
ter 3, application characteristics of VANET applications are studied and safety-critical
V2V applications are identified and listed. Chapter 4 discusses attacks on VANETs,
and identifies and lists the security requirements associated with applications listed in
13
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Chapter 3. Moreover, the performance requirements for the applications listed are also
identified and laid down in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, the security architecture and its components, for listed applications, are
discussed in detail. A security architecture consists of the different elements that are
required to sustain a secure functioning of VANET applications. In Chapter 6, authen-
tication protocols are identified that are applicable for applications identified in Chapter
3. Then, an evaluation is performed where the protocol computation overheads are cal-
culated, cryptographic features are analysed and the impact of application message size
on message delay and throughput are studied. The impact of messaging rate on the
time available for processing each message is also analysed. Chapter 7 gives concluding
remarks on protocol analysis and associated findings and gives further comments on the
areas that are still open.
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2 Background
The primary objective of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) is to provide traffic
safety and efficiency. Since VANETs are an extension of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MA-
NETs), a discussion of MANETs is essential to understand VANETs. This chapter gives
an introduction to MANETs and VANETs, their characteristics, applications and com-
plexities.
2.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
With the proliferation of mobile devices (cell phones, personal digital assistants (PDA),
laptops, and other handheld digital devices), and the exponential growth in the wireless
sector in the past decade, there is a revolutionary change in the way information is being
handled [21]. Users carry mobile devices that run applications and provide network ser-
vices, among which data services are the most demanded by users. Currently most of
these connections between mobile devices are infrastructure based [21, 38]. For example,
two or more laptops communicate with each other using a wireless access point; cell
phones are connected via cell phone towers.
Setting up infrastructure for mobile device communication is potentially costly. Users
will also face instances where the infrastructure required for desired communication is
simply not available. Additionally many of the mobile devices in use like laptops and
PDAs have only short range wireless capability. This has prompted the development of
an alternative way for mobile device communication in which each mobile device (node)
communicates with each other over wireless without the support of an infrastructure,
forming a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [38, 91].
2.1.1 Characteristics and Complexities of MANET
In a MANET, nodes operate in a peer to peer mode independent of any infrastructure
or a centralised administration. To communicate with nodes beyond the range, interme-
diate nodes forward messages to destination node over multiple hops. Each node acts
as an independent router and generates independent data. Fault detection and network
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management becomes distributed and hence more difficult. Nodes in MANETs are mo-
bile causing the network topology to change frequently and unpredictably. This causes
nodes to move in and out of wireless range resulting in node unavailability, changes in
packet routes, and possibly loss of packets. Since MANETs do not rely on any form of
central administration or control, nodes in the wireless range dynamically discover each
other and establish connection with each other. This helps to maintain the ad hoc net-
work even in situations where nodes keep moving in an out of each others wireless range.
Thus MANETs can be rapidly deployed and maintained with minimum user intervention.
Since mobile nodes run on batteries , the processing power available for each node is
limited. Since each node is acting as an end user system as well as a router, more energy
is consumed to support the function of forwarding packets to destination. Wireless links
have a significantly lower capacity compared to wired links [21]. Wireless links often
suffer from the effects of multiple access, fading, noise, and interference conditions that
prevents it from delivering a throughput equal to the maximum throughput. Each node
may be equipped with one or more wireless interfaces operating across different frequen-
cies. Each mobile node might also have a different hardware/software configuration with
different capabilities. Designing protocols and algorithms for such heterogeneous, asym-
metric links becomes a complex process.
Due to the pervasive nature of mobile nodes, we cannot assume that they will always be
under the control of their owners. Nodes could be stolen or tampered with. The shared
wireless medium is accessible to both legitimate and illegitimate users. The possibility
of eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks are more prevalent compared to
fixed line networks [27]. The applications involving MANETs range from those that in-
volve a small number of nodes to those containing tens of thousands of nodes. Scalability
is an important aspect of successful deployment of ad hoc networks. Compared to small
networks, the network management algorithms of large networks has to deal with alto-
gether different challenges in areas such as addressing, routing, location management,
interoperability, security, mobility, wireless technologies etc. Some of the current and
future radio technologies for MANET applications are summarised in Table 2.1 [38].
2.1.2 MANET Applications
The origin of MANETs dates back to the DARPA Packet Radio Network Project in
1972 [32]. The research in MANETs was confined to military for a long time, and in
the middle of 1990, with the advent of commercial wireless standards, the potential of
MANETs began to be tapped outside the military. Mentioned in Table 2.2 are some of
the current and potential areas of MANET applications [38].
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Technology Bit Rate (Mbps) Frequency Range
802.11b Upto 11 2.4 GHz 25-100 m (indoor)
802.11g Upto 54 2.4 GHz 25-50m (indoor)
802.11a Upto 54 5 GHz 10–40 m (indoor)
802.15.1 1 2.4 GHz 10 m (up to 100 m)
802.15.3 110-480 3-10 GHz ~10 m
HiperLAN2 Upto 54 5GHz 30–150 m
IrDA Upto 4 Infrared (850nm) ~10 m (line of sight)
HomeRF 1-10 2.4 GHz ~50 m
802.16 32-134 10-66 GHz 2-5 km
802.16 a/e 15-75 <6 GHz, < 11 GHz 7-10 km, 2-5 km
Table 2.1: MANET wireless technologies
Application Description
Tactical networks Military communication and operations • Automated
battlefields
Commercial and Civilian
environment
Electronic payments anytime and anywhere
environments • Dynamic database access, mobile
offices • Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks • Networks
of visitors at airports, sports stadiums, trade fairs,
shopping malls • Networks at construction sites
Emergency services Search and rescue operations • Disaster recovery •
Replacement of fixed infrastructure in case of
environmental disasters • Policing and fire fighting •
Supporting doctors and nurses in hospitals
Entertainment Multi-user games • Wireless P2P networking •
Outdoor Internet access • Theme parks
Education Universities and campus settings • Virtual classrooms
• Ad hoc communications during meetings or lectures
Table 2.2: MANET applications
2.2 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
To improve safety and traffic efficiency in vehicles, there has been significant research
efforts [65] by government, academia and industry to integrate computing and commu-
nication technologies into vehicles, which has resulted in the development of Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) [69]. Vehicular communication (VC ) is an important
component of ITS where vehicles communicate with other vehicles and/or road-side in-
frastructure, analyse and process received information, and makes decisions based on the
analysis.
Such a network of self organised vehicles and road-side infrastructure communicating
with each other over wireless, with a view to improve traffic safety and efficiency forms a
17
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VANET. It is envisioned that VANETs will be deployed over the next decade, to achieve
considerable market penetration around 2014 [79, 57].
2.2.1 Application Scenario
Integration of communication and computational features into vehicles are being done
with an objective to realise vehicular communication. Apart from traffic safety and ef-
ficiency, VANETs also support other applications like electronic toll collection, internet
access, parking, infotainment, traffic updates etc. Yet safety has remained the primary
focus of VANET research. Many literature are available on the classification of VANET
applications [5, 3, 73, 69, 25, 48, 54, 22].
[5] has classified VANET applications on the basis of requirements on the communication
system. Applications here are classified on the basis of whether the communication is
V2V (vehicle to vehicle), V2I (vehicle to infrastructure), I2V (infrastructure to vehicle),
single-hop/multi-hop, one-way/two-way etc. In [3], VANET applications are broadly
classified as safety and non-safety applications. In [54], applications are categorised into
information and warning functions (dissemination of road information like congestion,
surface condition etc.), communication based longitudinal control (vehicle platooning),
cooperative assistance systems (like lane merge warning, curve warning).
In another classification [22], VANET applications are classified into 3 main categories:
safety (life-critical, time critical applications like collision avoidance), traffic monitoring
and optimisation (providing traffic information so as to reduce traffic jams), infotain-
ment (internet and payment services). Raya and Hubax [73] has categorised VANET
applications as safety-related applications and other applications (traffic optimisation,
electronic toll collection, internet access, location based services to find nearby restau-
rants/gas stations etc). Safety applications are further categorised as traffic information,
general safety and liability-related.
[48] has classified safety messages into safety-related (related to safety, but latency not
critical) and safety-critical (latency critical safety message). [69] has classified safety
applications as life-critical safety applications (latency critical) and safety warning appli-
cation (safety related, latency not critical). Additionally it gives an added classification
called Group communications (e.g. cooperative platooning). In [25], the classification of
VANET applications are further refined by taking into account the various situations in
which a VANET application is performed.
18
2 Background
Application Classification and Definition
For the purpose of this thesis we will classify VANET applications as given in Table
2.3. The classification will be derived the above literature, but tuned to the focus of this
thesis (V2V safety-critical applications).
Application Type Classification Sub Classification
Safety Safety-critical applications V2V based
V2I/I2V based
Safety-related applications V2V based
V2I/I2V based
Non-safety Traffic Optimisation
Infotainment
Payment Services
Roadside Service Finder
Table 2.3: VANET application types
In the table, we have divided the applications into two major categories: safety and
non-safety.
1. Safety applications: Safety applications has the ability to reduce traffic accidents
and to improve general safety. These can be further categorised as safety-critical
and safety-related applications. In the design of security, it should be made sure
safety messages are not forged.
a) Safety-critical: These are used in the case of hazardous situations (e.g. like
collisions). [48]. It includes the situations where the danger is high or danger is
imminent [80]. Such applications can access the communication channel with
highest priority. In this case latency (≤100 ms) and reliability of messages
play an important role in realising the safety function. Safety-critical applica-
tions involve communication between vehicles (V2V) or between vehicles and
infrastructure/infrastructure and vehicles (V2I/I2V).
b) Safety-related: These include safety applications where the danger is either
low (curve speed warning) or elevated (work zone warning), but still fore-
seeable [80]. In safety-related applications, the latency requirements are not
as stringent as in the case of safety-critical ones. Safety-related applications
can be V2V or V2I/I2V.
2. Non-safety applications: These are applications that provide traffic information
and enhance driving comfort. Non-safety applications mostly involve a V2I or I2V
communication [3, 48] . These services access the channels in the communication
system, except the control channel. They access the channel in a low priority mode
compared to safety applications. Non-safety applications include applications for
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a) Traffic optimisation: Traffic information and recommendations, enhanced
route guidance etc.
b) Infotainment: Internet access, media downloading, instant messaging etc.
c) Payment services: Electronic toll collection, parking management etc.
d) Roadside service finder: Finding nearest fuel station, restaurants etc. This
involves communication of vehicles with road side infrastructure and the as-
sociated database.
2.2.2 Challenges of VANET
VANETs are an instantiation of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [43]. MANETs have
no fixed infrastructure and instead rely on ordinary nodes to perform routing of mes-
sages and network management functions. However, vehicular ad hoc networks behave
in different ways than conventional MANETs. Driver behaviour, mobility constraints,
and high speeds create unique characteristics of VANETs. These characteristics have
important implications for designing decisions in these networks. Thus, numerous chal-
lenges need to be addressed for inter-vehicular communications to be widely deployed
[43, 80, 84].
Node Velocity
One of the most important aspects of mobility in VANETs is the potential node velocity
[84]. Nodes either denote vehicles or road side units (RSUs) in this case. Node velocity
may range from zero for stationary RSUs or when vehicles are stuck in a traffic jam to
over 200 km per hour on highways. In particular, these two extremes each pose a special
challenge to the communication system. In case of very high node velocities, the mutual
wireless communication window is very short due to a relatively small transmission range
of several hundred meters [80]. For example, if two cars driving in opposite directions
with 90 km/h each, and if we assume a theoretical wireless transmission range of 300m,
communication is only possible for 12 seconds.
Moreover, the transceivers have to cope with physical phenomena like the Doppler effect
[80]. In the review of issues related to inter-vehicle communication in [13], it is shown
that routes discovered by topology-based routing protocols get invalid (due to changing
topology and link failures at high speeds) even before they are fully established. High
node velocities means frequent topological changes. However, slow movements usually
means stable topology, but a very high vehicle density, which results in high interference,
medium access problems, etc. For such reasons, very scalable communication solutions
are required.
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Movement Patterns
VANET are characterized by a potentially large number of nodes that are highly mo-
bile (i.e. according to cars’ speed). This high mobility can be more or less important
depending on road nature (small streets vs. highways). Vehicles do not move around
arbitrarily, but use predefined roads, usually in two directions. Unpredictable changes in
the direction of vehicles usually only occur at intersections of roads. We can distinguish
three types of roads [80]:
• City roads: Inside cities, the road density is relatively high. There are lots of smal-
ler roads, but also bigger, arterial roads. Many intersections cut road segments into
small pieces. Often, buildings right beside the roads limit wireless communication.
• Rural roads: These roads usually have much larger segments, which means that
intersections are more rare than in cities. Traffic conditions often do not allow
the formation of a connected network, because too few vehicles are on the road.
The overall direction of rural roads changes more frequently than the direction of
highways.
• Highways: Highways typically form a multi-lane road, which has very large seg-
ments and well-defined exits and on-ramps. High speed traffic encountered here.
A node can quickly join or leave the network in a very short time leading to frequent
network partitioning and topology changes. These movement scenarios pose special chal-
lenges particularly for the routing. Even on a highway, that gives smooth traffic in one
direction, frequent fragmentation was encountered in [13]. In the simulation of 9.2 miles
of a highway, in [13], a link lifetime of only about 1 minute was obtained even when
driving in the same direction (assuming 500 ft radio range).
Node Density
Apart from speed and movement pattern, node density is the third key property of vehi-
cular mobility [80]. The number of other vehicles in mutual radio range may vary from
zero to dozens or even hundreds. If we assume a traffic jam on a highway with 4 lanes,
one vehicle at every 20 meters and a radio range of 300m, every node theoretically has
120 vehicles in his transmission range.
In case of very low density, immediate message forwarding gets impossible. In this case,
more sophisticated information dissemination is necessary, which can store and forward
selected information, when vehicles encounter each other. In this case, the same message
may be repeated by the same vehicle multiple times. In high density situations, the
opposite must be achieved. Here, a message should be repeated only by selected nodes,
because otherwise this may lead to an overloaded channel [80].
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2.2.3 System Architecture
Figure 2.1: VANET System Architecture
A VANET system architecture consists of different domains and many individual compo-
nents as depicted in Figure 2.1 [30]. The figure shows three distinct domains (in-vehicle,
ad hoc, and infrastructure), and individual components(application unit, on-board unit,
and road-side unit).
In-vehicle domain: This consists of an on-board unit (OBU) and one or more ap-
plications units (AU) inside a vehicle. AU executes a set of applications utilising the
communication capability of the OBU. An OBU is at least equipped with a (short range)
wireless communication device dedicated for road safety, and potentially with other optio-
nal communication devices (for safety and non-safety communications). The distinction
between AU and OBU is logical; they can also reside in a single physical unit.
Ad hoc domain: An ad hoc domain is composed of vehicles equipped with OBUs
and road-side units (RSUs), forming the VANET. OBUs form a mobile ad hoc network
which allows communications among nodes without the need for a centralised coordina-
tion instance. OBUs directly communicate if wireless connectivity exists among them,
else multi-hop communications are used to forward data.
Infrastructure domain: The infrastructure consists of RSUs and wireless hotspots
(HT) that the vehicles access for safety and non-safety applications. While RSUs for
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internet access are typically set up by road administrators or other public authorities,
public or privately owned hot spots are usually set up in a less controlled environment.
These two types of infrastructure access, RSU and HT, also correspond to different ap-
plications types. In case that neither RSUs nor HT provide internet access, OBUs can
also utilise communication capabilities of cellular radio networks (GSM, GPRS, UMTS,
HSDPA, WiMax, 4G) if they are integrated in the OBU, in particular for non-safety
applications.
Application Units (AU)
An Application Unit (AU) is an in-vehicle entity (embedded or pluggable) and runs
applications that can utilise the OBU’s communication capabilities. Examples of AUs
are i) a dedicated device for safety applications like hazard-warning, or ii) a navigation
system with communication capabilities. Multiple AUs can be plugged in with a single
OBU simultaneously and share the OBUs processing and wireless resources. An AU
communicates solely via the OBU, which handles all mobility and networking functions
on the AUs’ behalf. The distinction between an AU and an OBU is only logical and an
AU can be physically co-located with an OBU [5, 30].
On-board Unit (OBU)
The On-Board Unit (OBU) is responsible for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to
infrastructure (V2I) communications [5, 30]. It also provides communication services to
AUs and forwards data on behalf of other OBUs in the ad hoc domain. An OBU is
equipped with at least a single network device for short range wireless communications
based on IEEE 802.11p radio technology. This network device is used to send, receive and
forward safety-related data in the ad-hoc domain. An OBU can be equipped with more
network devices, e.g. for non-safety communications, based on other radio technologies
like IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n. OBU functions and procedures include wireless radio access,
geographical ad hoc routing, network congestion control, reliable message transfer, data
security, IP mobility support, and others.
Road-side unit (RSU)
A Road-Side Unit (RSU) is a physical device located at fixed positions along roads and
highways, or at dedicated locations such as gas station, parking places, and restaurants.
An RSU is equipped with at least a network device for short range wireless communica-
tions based on IEEE 802.11p like radio technology. An RSU can also be equipped with
other network devices in order to allow communications with an infrastructure network.
An overview of the main functions of a RSU are given below [5, 30].
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• Extending the communication range of an ad hoc network by means of re-distribution
of information to other OBUs and cooperating with other RSUs in forwarding or
in distributing safety information (Figure 2.2).
• Running safety applications, such as for V2I warning (e.g. low bridge warning,
work-zone warning), and act as information source and receiver, respectively (Fi-
gure 2.3).
• Providing internet connectivity to OBUs (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.2: RSU extends communication range
Figure 2.3: RSU acts as information source
Figure 2.4: RSU providing internet access
2.2.4 Communication Patterns
As we have seen, communication in VANETs can be initiated from vehicles or infrastruc-
ture (V2V, V2I or I2V). These communications can be either one-way (no response from
receiver) or two-way (involves response from receiver). The communication could also
be single-hop or multi-hop. Safety applications either broadcast short status messages
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periodically and with high frequency (so called awareness messages), or they generate
messages when they detect a safety event and distribute them by multi-hop communi-
cation in a certain geographical area (event driven messages). In contrast, infotainment
applications typically establish sessions and exchange unicast data packets in greater
numbers, bidirectionally, and over multi-hop. The following communication patters can
be identified in VANETs [30, 80, 61, 5].
• Beaconing (Single-hop broadcast): Involves continuous update of informa-
tion among all neighbouring nodes, e.g. to supply them with up-to-date status
data like the position, speed, heading of a vehicle to allow for cooperative aware-
ness. Communication is single-hop and data packets are broadcast continuously
and periodically to all neighbours in reception range. In few cases, the beaconing
mechanism may be started by an external trigger, e.g. if an accident occurred.
Communication is strictly unidirectional, even if every node uses beaconing. Many
applications using beaconing have mid-range latency requirements [80, 61].
• Restricted Flooding (Multi-hop Broadcast): In flooding [59], messages to
be disseminated throughout a targeted area, are relayed by nodes (provided the
same message hasn’t been relayed before). The flooding is restricted to reduce
redundancy and channel overload, like e.g. in Gossipping [36]. Message propagation
is restricted by the use of traditional TTL, and/or by use of geographic distance
constraints (geocast). Geocast messages are typically sent upon a certain external
event and are not sent continuously. Geocast messages are unidirectional. Due to
their event-based nature, geocast messages will often require very low latency of
messages to inform addressed vehicles as fast as possible.
• Unicast: Data is unicast from a sender to a specific destination across multiple
wireless hops: the coordinates of the destination are given in the data packet, and
relaying nodes forward the packet to their neighbour with the minimum remaining
distance to the destination [61]. The communication may consist of only a single
hop, or route messages over multiple hops towards the destination. The destination
of packets is either a single node or a remote destination region. For multi-hop
routing, position-based routing approaches have shown superior performance due
to their adaptability to the high node movement dynamics in VANETs [80]. Unicast
routing may be uni or bidirectional, triggered by external events. Applications using
unicast routing have no immediate relation to safety.
2.2.5 Radio System and Communication Standards
In a VC system, the radio system is formed by the physical and data link layers. For
safety applications in a VANET, the radio system needs to maintain definite quality of
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service with respect to latency (transmission delay) and reliability (which includes chan-
nel throughput and packet reception rates) in the sending, receiving and forwarding of
messages [55]. The latency has to be less than 500ms (referred to as lifetime of safety
message), which is less than the time (700ms) it takes for a driver to react (like applying
brakes) after observing an event.
During safety communication, high mobility has two effects on messaging performance.
First, other vehicles may move out of the range of the sender, causing non-delivery of
messages. Secondly, high mobility leads to high packet errors and decreased channel
throughput. According to [90], the probability of message delivery failure has to be less
than 0.01. Moreover, the quality of service for messages should remain acceptable under
low or high vehicular speeds, and low or high vehicular densities.
This quality level of minimum latency and maximum reliability cannot be achieved if
existing radio bands are used or/and safety and non safety communications share the
same frequency and bandwidth [5]. This necessiates the need for a multi-channel radio
system, having separate channels for safety and non safety applications. Dedicated short
range communications (DSRC) is a wireless technology that offers communication bet-
ween the vehicles and roadside infrastructure. [12]. Different DSRC standards have been
in use in US, Europe, Korea and Japan, mainly for applications like electronic toll col-
lection (ETC) and automatic vehicle identification. These standards were not designed
to support V2V or safety communication in VANETs.
Currently we have at least three different organisations developing standards for safety
communication in 5.9 GHz ITS band, each tailored to their specific focus, supporting
802.11p: North American IEEE 802.11p + IEEE P1609 (WAVE), European C2C-CC1
Communication System (ETSI TC ITS) standardised by European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI2) , and Global ISO TC204 WG16 (CALM)3[29, 50].
• WAVE - IEEE focuses on lower layers (802.11) and simplified architecture for just
5.9 GHz communications.
• ETSI TC ITS - Supports 802.11a/b/g/p, GPRS/UMTS at lower layers. Uses a Eu-
ropean version of 802.11p. Focuses on car-to-car multi-hopping and geo-networking.
• CALM - Focuses on multiple media (802.11p, DSRC, IR, W-LAN etc) management.
These three groups are developing separate sets of standards, but they overlap in a large
number of areas. Recently, initiatives has been undertaken by members of IEEE, ISO
and ETSI to come up with measures to integrate these separate standards to a single
1http://www.car-to-car.org/
2www.etsi.org
3http://www.calm.hu/
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global standard [29].
North American DSRC and WAVE
In US, the standardisation efforts for VC [50] focusing on safety are concentrated in
the Department of Transportation (DOT) funded projects like the Vehicle Infrastructure
Integration Program (VII)4 and Cooperative Intersection Collision Avoidance System
(CICAS)5. Industry consortia that support those efforts are the Vehicle Infrastructure
Integration Consortium (VIIC) and the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP).
In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in US allocated 75 MHz in
the 5.9 GHz band as a new Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) spectrum,
primarily for the purpose of safety use in vehicles. Figure 2.5 shows the channel allocation
in North America [69].
Figure 2.5: North American 5.9 GHz DSRC channel allocation
The DSRC spectrum is divided into 8 channels - one 5MHz channel reserved for future
use and 7 channels of 10 MHz each [69, 82]. Channels 174, 176 and channels 180, 182
can be aggregated to form 20 MHz channels 175 and 181 respectively. Channel 178 is the
control channel, meant for network control and safety communications only. Channels
172 and 184 are reserved for V2V advanced accident avoidance and high power public
safety applications respectively. Rest are available as both safety and non-safety channels.
The basic idea is that RSU announces to the OBU the applications (safety or other)
it supports, on the corresponding channel. OBU listens on the control channel, executes
4http://www.its.dot.gov/vii/
5http://www.its.dot.gov/cicas/
27
2 Background
safety applications first, switches channels and then executes non-safety applications.
Operating in the 10 MHz channels allows data communication rate of 27Mbps. If the
optional 20 MHz channels (175, 181) are used, data rates upto 54 Mbps can be obtained.
In 2001, IEEE adopted 802.11 and 802.11a as the preferred technologies for interope-
rability of DSRC operations in US [82]. The IEEE 802.11p standard (still in draft mode)
[4], a modified form of 802.11a, was adopted as the radio specification (physical and
MAC layers) suitable for DSRC safety applications. Higher communication layers for
the DSRC standard are defined in IEEE 1609.x series (1609.1, 1609.2, 1609.3, 1609.4),
which have been released for trial use [6, 69]. The DSRC communication stack contai-
ning IEEE 802.11p and IEEE 1609.x is collectively termed as Wireless Access for the
Vehicular Environment (WAVE)(Figure). Figure 2.6 [50] shows an overview of a WAVE
protocol stack.
Figure 2.6: WAVE protocol stack
The functionality of the layers above the physical and the MAC layer are described in
the IEEE 1609.x document series [6].
The benefits of North American 5.9 GHz DSRC are outlined in [3, 9]. The 5.9 GHz
DSRC has a maximum range of 1000 meters within the current standards. Under most
operating conditions, DSRC will be limited to less than 200 meters which is well-suited
for many vehicle safety applications. DSRC offers the capability of broadcasting mes-
sages for vehicle safety applications. One of the most significant potential advantages
of DSRC is that latencies of less than 100 milliseconds seem to be possible with DSRC,
necessary for many of the vehicle safety applications. Such latencies do not appear to be
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achievable with other wireless communications technologies.
European channel allocation and ETSI TC ITS
The European VC research is mainly driven by public funded research projects and the
Car 2 Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC). A large number of European and na-
tional funded research projects contribute valuable results in different areas of VC. This
large number of projects lead to the creation of COMeSafety6 project, which coordinates
the different projects. It makes sure that the results of the different projects are compa-
tible with each other, and that they conform to the standardisation preparation in the
C2C-CC.
C2C-CC drives the standardisation process in Europe. C2C-CC prepares and supports
activities like the frequency allocation process, the standardisation of which is finally
carried out in ETSI. According to the documents ETSI TR 102 492-1 V1.1.1 (2005-06)
and ETSI TR 102 492-2 V1.1.1 (2006-03), a dedicated bandwidth of 30 MHz (5.875 GHZ
- 5.925 GHz) will be available for traffic safety applications in the 5.9 GHz band (see
Figure 2.6 [5]).
Figure 2.7: Frequency allocation in Europe
Additional 20 MHz might be available as future extension, for road safety and traffic
efficiency (5.905 GHz - 5.925 GHz). Non-safety ITS applications might use 20 MHz in
the band below 30 MHz. Further details on how to use the available spectrum are still
under discussion, like for instance the number of channels, the placement of a control
channel, or the number of radio modules that should be used (single vs. dual). An
overview of the C2C Communication protocol stack is given in Figure 2.8 [5].
The C2C architecture supports three radio systems: 802.11p* (indicates IEEE 802.11p
6http://www.comesafety.org/
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Figure 2.8: C2C Communication System protocol stack
modified to suit European conditions), 802.11a/b/g and other radio (GPRS, UMTS).
Non-safety applications (or non critical safety applications may) use TCP/UDP layers
and 802.11a/b/g or GPRS/UMTS for communication. Critical safety application com-
munication is strictly confined to C2C Network and Transport layers and 802.11p* cou-
pled with IEEE 1609.4.
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Applications
An analysis of VANET classification and its basis of classification was done in chapter
2. In this chapter, we will identify potential V2V safety-critical applications and their
application characteristics. As the next step, in subsequent chapters, we will identify
their security and performance requirements, and then outline a security architecture
for a secure VANET system. For the purpose of identifying applications, application
requirements, and security requirements, the methodology outlined in [47, 48] will be
referred to.
3.1 Application Characteristics
Application characteristics are the properties that are used to distinguish one VANET
application from another [47]. They answer the most relevant questions about an ap-
plication like importance, technical requirements and application situation. The general
characteristics of a VANET application are given below [47, 3, 48].
1. Safety influence: Among the different applications, we find different levels on
influence of safety. Applications can be safety-critical (used in hazardous situa-
tions like collision), safety-related or non-safety. The definitions have already been
elaborated in Chapter 2. The safety characteristic decides how much attention an
application gets, as far as security is concerned.
2. In-Car: This specifies if an application involves in-car systems like sensors, soft-
wares, brakes or engines. This has security implications because these parts are
critical for safe vehicle operation.
3. Driver involvement: This explains the extend of driver’s involvement in the
execution of an application. It can be represented by the following numerical values.
Messages of category 3 should be absolutely trustable.
a) 0=no driver involvement
b) 1=driver awareness
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c) 2=driver attention required
d) 3=driver reaction necessary
4. Messaging type: Messaging type is determined by the origin and destination of
vehicular communication. Based on this it can be V2V, V2I or I2V. Security is
influenced because infrastructural components of VANETs usually do not require
privacy.
5. Direction of communication: Communication in this case can either be one-
way (messages without response) or two-way (messages with response). Regar-
ding security, typical one-way communication raises the question of whether to trust
the message. In a two-way communication, like in the case of electronic payment,
encryption of data is likely needed.
6. Forwarding of messages: Applications require either single-hop, multi-hop
or relevancy-based (nodes forward message to other nodes) communications.
Security in this case lies with secure routing, which is hard to obtain, because
routing involves multiple (possibly fraudulent) nodes.
a) Single-hop: In single-hop communication, messages are directly sent to the
destination, which is within the communication range of the sender. Normally
for single-hop communication, a range of at least 150 m is assumed for normal
road conditions [48].
b) Multi-hop: Multi-hop communication is used when the destination is beyond
the wireless range of the sender. In this case messages from sender are forwar-
ded to destination by intermediate nodes. A position-based routing scheme is
used to realise multi-hop.
c) Relevancy-based: Messages are transported passively, using a content and
situation based relevancy calculation. With this transport mechanism, mes-
sages can be spread in an area even with very low network connectivity.
7. Addressing: Addressing indicates who all receives the message when it is being
sent. Since many VC contains position information, securing position information
is vital.
a) Unicast addressing: In the case of unicast addressing, receiver is either an
OBU or an RSU. Message is addressed to a single destination.
b) Broadcast: In a broadcast, message is send to all entities within the wi-
reless range of a sender. Broadcast can either be periodic and single-hop
(beaconing) or limited multi-hop (restricted flooding) based on TTL (time
to live) or geographical destination. In the case of flooding, receiver of message
broadcasts the message until TTL=0 [80].
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c) Geocast: Is the restricted flooding based on geographical destination. All
network entities receiving a packet must check their own position to decide
whether they are intended to process the packet. In case of single-hop, only
those entities in the defined region are receivers (no relaying). In case of
multi-hop, if sender is already in the target region, flood the packet within
the region. If sender is outside the target region, packet is forwarded to the
target region based on routing protocol, then flooded.
8. Periodic or event-driven: Describes whether the transmission is triggered by
an event (i.e. event-driven), or whether it is sent automatically at regular intervals
(i.e. periodic).
9. Minimum Frequency: This is the rate at which a transmission should be repea-
ted (if it is periodic).
10. Maximum Range: Is the communication distance between two units that is
needed to effectively support a particular application.
11. Latency: Is the maximum duration of time allowable between when information is
available to be transmitted and when it is received. For safety-critical applications,
latency ≤100 ms. For safety-related applications, latency > 100 ms and latency ≤
1000 ms [3].
12. Message size: Is the size of the message that is being sent in VANET commu-
nication, not including the cryptographic overheads. Different message sizes have
been assumed for safety applications, from 100-500 bytes [88, 82, 53, 77, 68, 8].
3.2 Creating Application List
As we have seen in chapter 2, there are numerous ways in which VANET applications
can be classified. Since the intend was to focus on V2V safety-critical communications,
we have classified VANET applications on the basis of V2V communications and safety-
critical/safety-related applications.
Classifications of VANET applications are mostly driven by the industry. In VSCC [3],
a project conducted by CAMP1 and sponsored by U. S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), VANET applications have been categorised as safety and non safety applica-
tions. The safety applications are further sub-classified as shown in Table 3.1. These
application categories include V2V, V2I and I2V communications for safety.
1CAMP comprises the following companies: BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM, Nissan, Toyota, and
VolksWagen
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Safety applications category Safety applications
Intersection Collision Avoidance
Traffic Signal Violation Warning · Stop Sign
Violation Warning · Left Turn Assistant · Stop Sign
Movement Assistance · Intersection Collision
Warning · Blind Merge Warning · Pedestrian
Crossing Information at Designated Intersections
Public Safety
Approaching Emergency Vehicle Warning ·
Emergency Vehicle Signal Preemption · SOS Services
· Post-Crash Warning
Sign Extension In-Vehicle Signage · Curve Speed Warning · Low
Parking Structure Warning · Wrong Way Driver
Warning · Low Bridge Warning · Work Zone Warning
· In-Vehicle Amber Alert
Vehicle Diagnostics and Maintenance Safety Recall Notice · Just-In-Time Repair
Notification
Information from Other Vehicles
Cooperative Forward Collision Warning ·
Vehicle-Based Road Condition Warning · Emergency
Electronic Brake Lights · Lane Change Warning ·
Blind Spot Warning · Highway Merge Assistant ·
Visibility Enhancer · Cooperative Collision Warning ·
Cooperative Vehicle-Highway Automation System
(Platoon) · Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control ·
Road Condition Warning · Pre-Crash Sensing ·
Highway/Rail Collision Warning · Vehicle-To-Vehicle
Road Feature Notification
Table 3.1: VSCC safety applications list
Based on the applications identified by VSCC, the European SEVECOM2 project has
come up with its own application list, having a different classification of VANET applica-
tions. Moreover it has identified applications on the basis of whether its is safety-critical
or safety-relevant. From the list of applications compiled by SEVECOM [48], we can
identify twelve V2V safety-critical applications as given below.
• Cooperative Platooning, Intersection Collision Warning, Wrong-way Driver War-
ning, Emergency Electronic Brake Lights, Pre-crash Sensing, Blind Spot /Lane
Change Warning, Cooperative Forward Collision Warning, Approaching Emer-
gency Vehicle Warning, Emergency Vehicle At Scene, SOS Services, Post-Crash
Warning, Rail Collision Warning.
2http://www.sevecom.org/. This is a European initiative dedicated to security in VANETs.
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Safety-critical applications are also listed in [80] under a different categorisation as shown
below.
• Active safety (Danger of collision): Intersection Collision Warning, Emergency
Electronic Brake Lights, Blind Spot /Lane Change Warning, Cooperative Forward
Collision Warning, Warning about Pedestrians Crossing, Rail Collision Warning.
• Active safety (Crash imminent): Pre-crash Sensing.
From the list of applications compiled by VSCC, SEVECOM and [80], and the definition
of safe-critical applications in Chapter 2 (2.2.1), we can derive our list of four applications
for further analysis as given in Table 3.2. Each application is associated with the required
set of application characteristics and its corresponding values.
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Pre-crash sensing Y 0 V2V S 1 E B 20 435 50 MT
Cooperative forward
collision warning
N 3 V2V M 1 P G 100 419 150 MT
Electronic brake lights N 3 V2V M 1 E G 100 288 300 NT
Blind spot/Lane change
warning
N 2 V2V S 1 P G 100 288 150 NT
MT=Medium-term NT=Near-term P=Periodic E=Event-driven S=Single-hop M=Multi-hop B=Broadcast
G=Geocast Y=Yes N=No 1=one-way
Table 3.2: V2V safety-critical applications (Application requirements)
The list of applications in Table 3.2 were chosen due to the following reasons.
• These applications meet our definition of V2V safety-critical applications in Chap-
ter 2. They represent two high priority safety scenarios: scenarios avoiding crashes
and where crash is imminent (pre-crash sensing).
• These safety-critical applications have the most stringent latency requirements of
all VANET applications (20-100 ms). The other identified applications have time
constraints of 100 ms or more.
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• They represent the applications that have been identified as the most potential
safety applications in [3] and most likely to be deployed in near future. This is
indicated by ’Deployment’ column in Table 3.2. ’Near-term’ represents possible
deployment between 2007 and 2011. ’Mid-term’ represents possible deployment
between 2012-2016.
A preliminary analysis of the selected applications show that
• All applications require cooperative awareness between vehicles.
• The minimum message size is small, less than 100 bytes, not including the crypto-
graphic overhead [8, 3].
• The communication range varies from 50-300 meters.
• Applications are one-way, broadcast/geocast and periodic/event-driven.
• Except for pre-crash sensing (20 ms latency), all applications have a latency of 100
ms.
3.3 Application Description
3.3.1 Pre-crash sensing
Pre-crash sensing [3, 48] can be used to prepare for imminent, unavoidable collisions .
Based on position information obtained by beaconing, the car can determine whether
a crash is about to occur. This application could use communication in combination
with other sensors to mitigate the severity of a crash. Countermeasures may include
pre-tightening of seat-belts, airbag pre-arming, front bumper extension, etc.
• Communication Requirements: V2V, one-way communication, broadcast, event-
driven
• Minimum frequency (update rate): ~50 Hz, Allowable latency: ~20 ms
• Data regularly transmitted and/or received: vehicle type, position, velocity, acce-
leration, heading, yaw-rate
• Maximum required range of communication: ~50 m
• Minimum message size: 435 bits
3.3.2 Cooperative (forward) collision warning
Cooperative collision warning [48, 3] collects surrounding vehicle locations and dynamics
and warns the driver when a collision is likely. The vehicle receives data regarding the
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position, velocity, heading, yaw rate, and acceleration of other vehicles in the vicinity.
Using this information along with its own position, dynamics, and roadway information
(map data), the vehicle will determine whether a collision with any vehicle is likely. In
addition, the vehicle will transmit position, velocity, acceleration, heading, and yaw rate
to other vehicles.
• Communication Requirements: V2V, one-way communication, geocast, periodic
• Minimum frequency (update rate): ~10 Hz, Allowable latency: ~100 ms
• Data to be transmitted and/or received: position, velocity, acceleration, heading,
yaw-rate
• Maximum required range of communication: ~150 m
• Minimum message size: 419 bits
3.3.3 Emergency electronic brake lights
When a vehicle brakes hard, the Emergency Electronic Brake light application [48, 3]
sends a message to other vehicles following behind. This application will help the driver
of following vehicles by giving an early notification of lead vehicle braking hard even
when the driver’s visibility is limited (e.g. a large truck blocks the driver’s view, heavy
fog, rain). This information could be integrated into an adaptive cruise control system.
• Communication Requirements: V2V, one-way communication, geocast, event-driven
• Minimum frequency (update rate): ~10 Hz, Allowable latency: ~100 ms
• Data to be transmitted and/or received: position, heading, velocity, deceleration
• Maximum required range of communication: ~300 m
• Minimum message size: 288 bits
3.3.4 Blind spot warning / Lane change warning
Blind spot : This application [48, 3] warns the driver when he intends to make a lane
change and his blind spot is occupied by another vehicle. The application receives per-
iodic updates of the position, heading and speed of surrounding vehicles via vehicle-to-
vehicle communication. When the driver signals a lane change or turn intention, the
application determines the presence or absence of other vehicles/pedestrians/bicyclists
in his blind spot. In case of a positive detection, a warning is provided to the driver.
Lane change: This application [48, 3] provides a warning to the driver if an intended lane
change may cause a collision with a nearby vehicle. The application receives periodic
37
3 Identifying V2V Safety-Critical Applications
updates of the position, heading and speed of surrounding vehicles via vehicle-to-vehicle
communication. When the driver signals a lane change intention, the application uses this
communication to predict whether or not there is an adequate gap for a safe lane change,
based on the position of vehicles in the adjacent lane. If the gap between vehicles in the
adjacent lane will not be sufficient, the application determines that a safe lane change is
not possible and will provide a warning to the driver.
• Communication Requirements: V2V, one-way communication, geocast, periodic
• Minimum frequency (update rate): ~10 Hz, Allowable latency: ~100 ms
• Data to be transmitted and/or received: position, heading, velocity, acceleration,
turn signal status
• Maximum required range of communication: ~150 m
• Minimum message size: 288 bits
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Having identified the application characteristics for the selected applications, the next
step would be to identify the security requirements of each application. This is necessary
to protect VC messaging system from abuse. Since the safety-critical safety applications
aim to provide traffic safety (like avoiding collisions) warnings in a very limited time
frame, any attack on the messaging system (which results in wrong warnings or no war-
nings) will result in accidents.
This chapter will analyse the general threats and attacks faced by a VC system, identify
the security requirements necessary to address the threats, and list the security requi-
rements for the selected applications. Apart form identifying the security requirements
of selected applications, the performance requirements of the secure communication pro-
tocols used in the communication of selected applications are studied. The varying size
of safety-critical messages and its impact on the performance of the secure messaging
protocol will be specially focused.
4.1 Security Challenges of VANETs
The use of wireless links and time critical nature of VANET safety applications makes
it imperative that VC be reliable and trustworthy. A lack of this security element in
safety-critical application can make it a lot more than annoying, since lives are at stake
during the execution of a safety application. The security of a VC system is prone to
vulnerabilities and requires analysis at the radio channel level [49, 84], network level
[28, 18], and at the application level [60, 68, 66, 73].
Eichler in [27] gives an overview of MANET security challenges and attacks. A spe-
cific overview of the security threats to DSRC/WAVE is covered in [49]. The concept
of stealth attacks, which are routing attacks carried out in a low cost manner, with a
very low risk of attacker identification, are elaborated in [42]. They can be as harmful as
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The importance of privacy, the need to protect privacy
in VANETs and possible solutions are explained in [24].
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[84, 76, 72, 52, 73, 66, 68, 60, 47] provides extensive information on the adversary types,
security vulnerabilities/attacks, security challenges, security requirements and security
architecture of VANETs.
4.1.1 Adversary Model
To have a better understanding of possible attacks on VANET systems, it is necessary
for us to define the adversaries. This helps in determining the scope of resources needed
to secure a vehicular system. The following broad classes of adversaries are identified in
a vehicular environment [60, 66, 73].
1. Active vs. Passive: A passive attacker can only eavesdrop on the wireless chan-
nel. This attack varies from a noisy next door neighbour to a government agency
trying to profile drivers. An active attacker can generate or modify/drop or replay
messages in order to give false information to the network vehicles so that attacker
can maximise his gain in the network irrespective of the costs (e.g. a greedy dri-
ver posing as an emergency vehicle and clearing way for the attacker to proceed)
[73, 66].
2. Insider vs. Outsider: An insider is an authenticated member of the network
who can communicate with other members. Being a part of the network, an insider
is already in possession of some network credentials, like public keys [73]. An
insider can cause more damage to the system by tampering with an OBU, than an
outsider who has limited access to the system. As far as an outsider is concerned,
he normally does not posses any cryptographic credentials or direct physical access
to the system.
3. Malicious vs. Rational: A malicious attacker seeks no personal benefits from
the attacks and aims to harm the members or the functionality of the network (e.g.
terrorists who deliberately cause traffic accidents) [66, 73]. Hence, he may employ
any means disregarding corresponding costs and consequences. On the contrary,
a rational attacker seeks personal profit and hence is more predictable in terms of
the attack means and the attack target.
4. Independent vs. Colluding: Attackers can act independently or in collusion
where they exchange information and cooperate to make attacks more effective.
For example colluding vehicle can report an imaginary traffic jam or accident to
convince other drivers (since the report comes from multiple vehicles others are
likely to believe it) and clear way for the attackers [76].
5. Local vs. Extended: An attacker can be limited in scope, even if he controls
several entities (vehicles or RSU), which makes him local. This is because the limi-
ted range of OBUs and RSUs make the attack scope limited. An extended attacker
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controls several entities that are scattered across the network, thus extending his
scope. This distinction is especially important in privacy-violating and wormhole
attacks which will explained shortly [73].
4.1.2 Attacks on VANETs
A VC system can be compromised by an attacker by manipulating either vehicular system
or the security protocols. Hence two kinds of attacks can be visualised against vehicular
systems: attacks against messages and attacks against vehicles. A general overview of
the attacks are mentioned below [76, 73, 66, 27].
Basic Attacks Against Messages
1. Forgery Attacks: Attackers diffuse wrong information in the network to affect
the behaviour of other drivers (e.g., to divert traffic from a given road and thus
free it for themselves) (Fig. 4.1 [73]) .
Figure 4.1: Forgery attack
In this example, colluding attackers (A2 and A3) disseminate false information to affect the decisions of
other vehicles (V) and thus clear the way of attacker A1.
2. Cheating with sensor information: Attackers in this use this attack to alter
their perceived position, speed, direction, etc. in order to escape liability, notably
in the case of an accident. In the worst case, colluding attackers can clone each
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other, but this would require retrieving the security material and having full trust
between the attackers. In cases where liability is involved, drivers may be tempted
to cheat with some information that can determine the location of their car at a
given time [76, 73].
3. In-transit traffic tampering: Any node acting as a relay can disrupt commu-
nications of other nodes: it can drop or corrupt messages, or meaningfully modify
messages. In this way, the reception of valuable or even critical traffic notifications
or safety messages can be manipulated. Moreover, attackers can replay messages
(e.g., to illegitimately obtain services such as traversing a toll check point). In fact,
tampering with in-transit messages may be simpler and more powerful than forgery
attacks [76].
4. Masquerading: The attacker actively pretends (impersonates) to be another ve-
hicle by using false identities and can be motivated by malicious or rational objec-
tives. Message fabrication, alteration, and replay can also be used towards mas-
querading. A masquerader can be a threat: consider, for example, an attacker
masquerading as an emergency vehicle to mislead other vehicles to slow down and
yield.
5. Privacy violation: With vehicular networks deployed, the collection of vehicle-
specific information from overheard vehicular communications will become parti-
cularly easy [76]. Then inferences on the drivers’ personal data could be made,
and thus violate her or his privacy. The vulnerability lies in the periodic and
frequent vehicular network traffic. In all such occasions, messages will include, by
default, information (e.g., time, location, vehicle identifier, technical description,
trip details) that could precisely identify the originating node (vehicle) as well as
the drivers’ actions and preferences.
6. Denial of Service (DoS): The attacker may want to bring down the VANET
or even cause an accident. There are many ways to perform this attack, either by
sending messages that would lead to improper results or by jamming the wireless
channel (this is called a Denial of Service, or DoS attack) so that vehicles cannot
exchange safety messages.
Other Attacks
These include other sophisticated versions of basic attacks or a combination of basic
attacks on messages as well as attacks on vehicles [73, 49, 27].
1. Hidden vehicle: In this scenario, a vehicle broadcasting warnings will listen for
feedback from its neighbours and stop its broadcasts if it realises that at least
one of these neighbours is better positioned for warning other vehicles [73]. This
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reduces congestion on the wireless channel. A hidden vehicle attack consists in
deceiving vehicle A into believing that the attacker is better placed for forwarding
the warning message, thus leading to silencing A and making it hidden (has stopped
broadcasting).
2. Tunnel: Since GPS signals disappear in tunnels, an attacker may exploit this
temporary loss of positioning information to inject false data once the vehicle leaves
the tunnel and before it receives an authentic position update [73]. The physical
tunnel in this example can also be replaced by an area jammed by the attacker,
which results in the same effects.
3. Sinkhole attack: In sinkhole attack, an intruder attracts surrounding nodes with
unfaithful routing information, and then performs selective forwarding or alters the
data passing through it [27]. The attacking node tries to offer a very attractive link
e.g. to a gateway. Therefore, a lot of traffic bypasses this node. Besides simple
traffic analysis other attacks like selective forwarding or denial of service can be
combined with the sinkhole attack.
4. Wormhole attack: The attacker connects two distant parts of the ad hoc network
using an extra communication channel as a tunnel. As a result two distant nodes
assume they are neighbours and send data using the tunnel. The attacker has the
possibility of conducting a traffic analysis or selective forwarding attack. This also
extends the range of the attacker. This attack and a possible countermeasure (the
concept of packet leashes) is presented in [39].
5. Sybil attack: Large-scale peer-to-peer systems face security threats from faulty or
hostile remote computing elements. To resist these threats, many such systems em-
ploy redundancy. However, if a single faulty entity can present multiple identities,
it can control a substantial fraction of the system, thereby undermining this re-
dundancy [23]. The Sybil attack especially aims distributed system environments.
The attacker tries to act as several different identities/nodes rather than one. This
allows him to forge the result of a voting used for threshold security methods.
6. On-board tampering: Other than communication protocols, an attacker may
select to tinker with data (e.g., velocity, location, status of vehicle parts) at their
source, tampering with the on-board sensing and other hardware. In fact, it may
be simpler to replace or by-pass the realtime clock or the wiring of a sensor, ra-
ther than modifying the binary code implementation of the data collection and
communication protocols [76].
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4.2 VANET Security Requirements
Security requirements are the measures that are put in place in order to secure the
VC system from the effects of possible attacks identified in the previous section. In
identifying the security requirements, application needs and the basic attacks on VC
system are considered. The security requirements are derived from primary security
goals like confidentiality, integrity and availability. From a review of existing literature
[47, 60, 62, 68, 48], the general security requirements of a VC system can be derived
as authentication, integrity, entity authentication, confidentiality, privacy, availability,
access control, auditability (non-repudiation) and physical security.
4.2.1 Authentication
In safety application, trust is important. Authentication ensures that a message is trus-
table by correctly identifying the sender of the message [47]. With ID authentication,
the receiver is able to verify a unique ID of the sender. The ID could be the license
plate or chassis number of the vehicle. In other cases receivers are not interested in the
actual identity of nodes. They are satisfied if they are able to verify that the sender
has a certain property. Property authentication is a security requirement that allows
verifying properties of the sender, e.g. that the sender is a car, a traffic sign etc. For
applications using location information, location authentication allows to verify that
the sender is actually at the claimed position, or that the message location claim is valid.
4.2.2 Integrity
Integrity requirements demand that the information from the sender to the receiver must
not be altered or dropped.
4.2.3 Entity Authentication
Entity authentication ensures that the recently received message is fresh and live. It
ascertains that a message was sent and received in a reasonably small time frame [60].
4.2.4 Confidentiality
Confidentiality requires that the information flowing from sender to receiver should not
be eavesdropped. Only the sender and the receiver should have access to the contents of
the message. e.g. instant messaging between vehicles.
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4.2.5 Privacy
Privacy is an important factor for the public acceptance and successful deployment of
VANETs [24]. With vehicular networks deployed, the collection of vehicle-specific infor-
mation from overheard vehicular communications will become particularly easy. Then
inferences on the drivers’ personal data could be made, and thus violate her or his
privacy. The vulnerability lies in the periodic and frequent vehicular network traffic mes-
sages which will include, by default, information (e.g., time, location, vehicle identifier,
technical description, trip details) that could precisely identify the originating node (ve-
hicle) as well as the drivers’ actions and preferences [76].
Privacy, along with security, focuses on private vehicles (e.g., excluding emergency ve-
hicles, buses, etc.) because the operation of all other VC nodes, including RSUs, does
not raise any privacy concerns, and all the other nodes should be readily identifiable [60].
A primary concern for VC systems is to provide location privacy, by preventing others
(any observer) from learning past or future locations of a VC system user (vehicle driver
or passenger). We can safeguard location privacy by seeking to satisfy a more general
requirement: anonymity for vehicle message transmissions.
Ideally, it should be impossible for any observer to learn if a specific vehicle has trans-
mitted or will transmit a message (more generally, take an action according to a VC
protocol), and it should be impossible to link any two or more messages (in general,
actions) of the same vehicle. Even if an observer tried to guess, there should be only a
low probability of linking a vehicle’s actions or identifying it among the set of all vehicles,
that is, the anonymity set.
Rather than aiming for this strong anonymity, a relatively weaker level of protection
is required: messages should not allow for the identification of their sender, and two or
more messages generated by the same vehicle should be difficult to link to each other.
More precisely, messages produced by a vehicle over a protocol-selectable period of time t
can always be linked by an observer that receives them. But messages m1, m2 generated
at times t1, t2 such that t2 > t1 + t cannot be linked.
ID privacy [47] specifies how much the identity of the sender should be kept secret.
Depending on the applications, location privacy has different levels, which range from
distributing location information freely throughout the network to totally keeping it
private. Although privacy requirements apply for normal communications, public au-
thorities wishing to have access to the identity or location information of cars may have
jurisdictional access.
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4.2.6 Availability
In safety applications like post-crash warning, the wireless channel has to be available
so that approaching vehicles can still receive the warning messages. If the radio channel
goes out (e.g. jamming by an attacker), then the warning cannot be broadcast and the
application itself becomes useless. Hence high availability of communication systems are
critical.
4.2.7 Access Control
Access control is necessary for applications that distinguishes between different access
levels a node or infrastructure component has [47]. This is established through specific
system-wide policies, which specifies what each node is allowed to do in the network.
For instance, an authorised garage may be allowed to fully access wireless diagnostics,
whereas other parties may only be granted limited access. Another form of access control
can be the exclusion of misbehaving nodes (e.g. by an intrusion detection system using
a trust management scheme) from the VANET by certificate revocation or other means.
4.2.8 Auditability
Auditability , the non-repudiation requirement, is the mechanism by which senders or
receivers can prove that messages have been received or sent respectively [47]. In some
applications, messages may only be stored for a very limited time (e.g. the last 10 seconds
in a ring buffer) and made permanent only in case of an incident (e.g. crash).
4.2.9 Physical Security
This is essential to prevent unauthorised access of vehicle which could lead to unautho-
rised use, compromise of radio system or cryptographic credentials.
4.3 Identifying Application Security Requirements
As we have already seen, security and privacy-enhancing mechanisms are necessary for
an effective VANET deployment. Based on the threats and attacks on a vehicular system
discussed in 4.1.2, the security requirements of the selected applications has been derived
by SEVECOM, as given in Table 4.1 [48]. None of the applications in the table intend
to pass any confidential messages to vehicles around them. Rather, they broadcast mes-
sages that should be readable by vehicles in their wireless range. Hence confidentiality
is irrelevant for the selected applications.
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Pre-crash sensing 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2
Cooperative forward collision warning 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 2
Electronic brake lights 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 2
Blind spot/Lane change warning 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 2
0=irrelevant 1=important 2=very important
Table 4.1: V2V safety-critical applications (Security requirements)
Pre-crash sensing is an application that comes into play when accident is imminent.
Its purpose is not to avoid an accident, but to make vehicles ready for an imminent
crash. Hence auditability is irrelevant. Whereas the other three applications provide
surrounding vehicles with information with a view to improve driver awareness and thus
reduce accidents. In the event of an accident, it becomes necessary for law enforcement
agencies to prove the question of liability. Hence auditability is essential in the case of
these three applications.
Authentication, integrity and entity authentication are required to make sure that the
sender is authentic, message is not spoofed, modified, deleted or replayed. Property au-
thentication verifies if the sender is a vehicle or an RSU. Location authentication verifies
if the location information in the message is authentic. Also the availability of wireless
media and messages has to be ensured without which the applications will fail to deliver
messages successfully to intended recipients.
The applications in Table 4.1 have to advertise location information in their periodic
broadcast to surroundings. Hence location privacy is not relevant. But it should not
be possible to correlate two messages from the same vehicle nor should the identity of
the vehicle be disclosed. Hence ID privacy is important and ID authentication is not
desirable. It is essential that the cryptographic credentials should not be tampered with,
for the reliability of security protocols.
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4.4 Identifying Performance Requirements
For safety communication in VANETs, the application requirements has to be taken into
account ,and also the safety requirements has to be satisfied. This makes sure that the
safety communications are effective and reliable, free from internal or external interfe-
rences. Secure communication protocols used in safety applications are designed in such
a way that they satisfy the application and security requirements for that application.
Apart from security requirements, it is essential that they also meet certain performance
requirements, without which they might not be suitable for use in safety applications.
In VANETs, the reliability, latency and channel efficiency deteriorate with speed, traf-
fic density and transmission range. The traffic density depends on message rate (mes-
sages/second), size (bytes/message), message range (meters), and density of vehicles
producing these messages [88]. It is important to chose VC system parameters ideally
without which VANET will fail to function properly. For e.g. a message update slower
than once every 500 ms is probably too slow. Driver reaction time to stimuli like brake
lights can be of the order of 0.7 seconds and higher. Thus if updates come in slower than
every 500 ms, the driver may realise something is wrong before the safety system. This
would make the driver think the safety system is not effective.
In [88], the author has outlined different traffic parameter ranges for message rates (cor-
responding to high to low traffic conditions), message sizes (corresponding to established
standards), vehicle density and channel data rates for safety communication, so that the
performance requirements for safety communication system is met. In the case of secure
communication protocols, the impact of security mechanisms on safety communication
will be analysed. For communication protocols, there is an additional factor that contri-
butes to message size and communication delay: size of cryptographic credentials and
the time taken for authentication (in the case of PKCS (Public Key Cryptography Stan-
dards), the size of signature and public key and the time required to verify the signature)
[72].
Deriving from the above analysis, this thesis will focus on the following parameters while
doing a performance evaluation of a secure communication protocol used for safety-critical
applications.
• Message size vs. message delay: Messages of different sizes are considered
and the maximum message delay per message is calculated for both highway and
city scenarios. For the protocol to meet the performance requirement, the maxi-
mum message delay per message for the protocol should to be below the maximum
processing delay calculated for each message.
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• Message size vs. throughput: Messages of different sizes are considered and the
maximum message throughput is calculated for both highway and city scenarios.
For the protocol to meet the performance requirement, the calculated throughput
should to be less than the minimum bandwidth of the radio channel.
• Message rate vs. processing delay: The maximum tolerable processing delay
of each message for both highway and city scenarios is calculated. For the protocol
to meet the performance requirement, the signature verification delay per message
for the protocol should to be below the maximum processing delay calculated for
each message.
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The rich features of a VC system is a double edged sword, as they also give rise to various
vulnerabilities. Attacks against VC systems not only make it useless, but also make it
potentially dangerous (wrong warnings or failure to issue warnings). Security require-
ments are measures developed to counter attacks against a VC system . Based on the
security requirements that are identified, the security architecture of any VC system is
designed.
A security architecture consists of the different elements that are essential in addressing
security requirements and the subsequent implementation of security in a VC system.
The need for security architectures and different architecture proposals are explored in
[68, 46, 52, 73, 61, 34, 51, 60]. This chapter will first discuss the security architecture
for the V2V safety-critical applications identified in Section 4.3 (referred to as ’selected
applications’) This will be followed by additional assumptions required for security and
performance analysis of selected applications.
5.1 Architecture Components
5.1.1 Authorities
Authorities are trusted entities responsible for the issuance and management of identities
and credentials for nodes in VANETs [62]. [68, 73] proposes a system where the autho-
rity is a governmental transportation authority (GTA) or vehicle manufacturer (VM)
with which vehicles are registered. GTA or VM acts as the certification authority (CA)
certifying the credentials of vehicles, and also revokes certificates in case of vehicle mis-
behaviour. This implies the need for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) where Certificate
Authorities (CAs) will issue certified public/private key pairs to vehicles. The presence
of on-line authorities is not required, as connectivity and communication, especially over
the wireless medium, with an authority may be intermittent.
Similar to existing administrative processes and automotive authorities (e.g., city or
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state transit authorities), a large number of CAs will exist [61, 60]. Each of them is
responsible for the identity management of all vehicles registered in its region (natio-
nal territory, district, county, etc.). To enable interactions between nodes from different
regions, CAs provide certificates for other CAs (cross-certification) or provide foreigner
certificates to vehicles that are registered with another CA when they cross the geogra-
phical boundaries of their region [64].
5.1.2 Identification and Registration
Every vehicle that becomes a part of a VANET has to be identified with an electronic
identifier. Each vehicle has to store the following identities that are bound to related
cryptographic information:
Long-term identity (LTI): An electronic identity called an Electronic License Plate
(ELP) [41] issued by a government, or alternatively an Electronic Chassis Number (ECN)
issued by the vehicle manufacturer. These identities (further referred to simply by ELP)
should be unique and cryptographically verifiable (this can be achieved by attaching a
certificate issued by the CA to the identity) in order to identify vehicles to the police in
case this is required (usually, identities are hidden from the police).
Each ELP has a pair of long-term private and public cryptographic keys, kV and KV
respectively issued by manufacturers or authorities. A digital certificate provided by the
authority binds KV to ELP and to other data attributes of ELP like vehicle features
(colour, brand etc) [62][34]. kV is used to generate digital signatures to authenticate
ELP to the CA and request for pseudonyms.
Similarly to the physical license plates, the ELP should be changed (i.e., reloaded in
the vehicle) when the owner changes or moves, e.g., to a different region or country [73].
Infrastructure nodes and users may also have unique identities, registered with authori-
ties. The identities registered with the authority helps to link it to the respective vehicle’s
or owner’s identity. The lifetime of the certificate should be long, following the node life
cycle (or a significant fraction of it).
Infrastructure nodes can be considered as more trustworthy than other nodes, with res-
pect to specific functionality or attributes [62]. Public vehicles (police, fire etc), similarly
to infrastructure nodes, are considered more trustworthy, and they can be used to assist
security related operations. The user can be bound to its credentials and secrets through
some token she/he uniquely knows or possesses (e.g., pass-phrase, biometric data). The
user can be the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle, or in general any passenger.
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Short-term identity (STI): These are anonymous key pairs that are used to pre-
serve privacy. An anonymous key pair is a short-term public/private key pair that is
authenticated by the CA but contains neither information about nor public relationship
with (i.e., this relationship cannot be discovered by an observer without a special autho-
risation) the actual identity of the vehicle (i.e., its ELP). Normally, a vehicle will possess
a set of anonymous keys to prevent location tracking [73]. The CA signs each of the
public keys, and generates a set of pseudonyms [19] for the vehicle. Each pseudonym
contains an identifier of the CA, the lifetime of the pseudonym, the public key, and the
signature of the CA, and thus, no information about the identity of the vehicle. The CA
retains a mapping of vehicle/user identity and the pseudonym for purposes of liability.
5.1.3 Hardware Security Module
Hardware security module (HSM) is the trusted computing base of a vehicle. The pur-
pose of an HSM is to provide a physically protected environment for the storage of private
keys (long-term and short-term keys), the execution of cryptographic operations (mes-
sage signing and decryption of encrypted anonymous certificates) and key management
functions [60]. The HSM is physically separated from the OBU that performs public key
operations. The HSM must have an API through which it can provide services to the
other modules of the security architecture that run on the onboard unit (OBU) [46].
This API should support the digital signature and timestamping service (to prevent
replay of messages signed by HSM), the decryption service (to verify incoming pseudo-
nyms), as well as the key and device management services described in [73]. The HSM
should have its own battery, which can be recharged from the vehicle, and clock (for
timestamping service), which can be securely resynchronised, when passing by an RSU.
The access to this device should be restricted to authorised people. For example, cryp-
tographic private keys are generated and stored in HSM by vehicular authorities, short
term keys can be renewed at the periodic technical checkup of the vehicle, and expired
certificates can be changed by the user upon authentication [68, 60]. The use of secret in-
formation such as private keys requires that HSM be a tamper resistant hardware (TRH).
TRH contains a set of sensors that can detect hardware tampering and erase all the
stored keys to prevent them from being compromised. Economical options can be a
TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [73] that can resist software attacks but not sophistica-
ted hardware tampering. or other low-end tamper-resistant devices (e.g., smart cards).
In particular, commercially available low-end devices do not have built-in batteries and
consequently cannot provide a trusted internal clock. As pointed out in [61], without
a trusted source of time, such devices are not able to produce timestamps that can be
trusted by other participants in the system. For practical purposes, an HSM implemen-
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tation somewhere between high-end and low-end devices is needed.
The HSM handles short-term keys for the short-term identification and long-term keys
for the long-term identification of the vehicle [60]. The generation of short-term keys can
be initiated by any application running on the OBU. In contrast, the long-term keys are
generated at manufacturing time; however, they can be updated later by trusted autho-
rities. If the ownership of the vehicle changes, long-term key can be changed. Device
management and long-term key updates are achieved through signed commands from the
CA. In order to verify the signature on these commands, the HSM stores trusted root
public keys that are loaded into the device during the initialization procedure in a secure
environment.
[68, 60] proposes two such root public keys, K1 and K2, in the HSM, with the cor-
responding private keys held by the CA. If one of the CA’s private keys is compromised,
the corresponding public key, say K1, can be revoked. The revocation command must be
signed with the private key corresponding to K1 itself. Once K1 is revoked, a new key K3
can be loaded into the HSM by a command signed with the private key corresponding
to K2. In addition, when K1 is revoked, the HSM does not accept commands aimed
at revoking K2. This scheme ensures secure root key update unless both root keys are
compromised. The revocation of the HSM is also discussed by [60]
5.1.4 Authentication, Integrity and Non-Repudiation
The exchange of safety messages in a VANET needs authentication but not encryp-
tion. The simplest and the most efficient method is to assign to each vehicle a set of
public/private key pairs that will allow the vehicle to digitally sign messages and thus
authenticate itself to receivers. These public keys should be issued and signed by a trus-
ted authority. [73].
Under the PKI solution, before a vehicle sends a safety message, it signs it with its
private key and includes the CA’s certificate as follows:
V → ∗ : M, SigPrKV [M |T ], CertV
where V designates the sending vehicle, ∗ represents all the message receivers, M is
the message, | is the concatenation operator, and T is the timestamp to ensure mes-
sage freshness (entity authentication). The digital signature (SigPrKV [M |T ]) provides
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation properties to the message. It should be
noted that using nonces and sequence numbers instead of timestamps is not desirable
because of the burden of the inherent preliminary handshake and maintenance issues.
53
5 Security Architecture for Selected Applications
CertV is the public key certificate of V issued by CA.
The receivers of the message have to verify the public key of V using the certificate
and then verify V ’s signature using its certified public key. In order to do this, the
receiver should have the public key of the CA, which can be preloaded. Attaching a di-
gital signature and a certificate to each safety message for the sake of security inevitably
creates an overhead that can be larger than the message itself. To reduce overheads,
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and NTRU cryptosystem is preferred against RSA
[72]. Additionally overhead can be reduced by signing one in every few messages (opti-
misation).
Raya et.al in [73] has explored other possibilities to reduce overheads like symmetric
key types (pairwise, TESLA protocol [67, 40] , group keys [70]) and hybrid protocols
(pseudonyms with group signatures) [17, 20] for authentication.
Symmetric cryptographic primitives are much more efficient (in terms of time and space
overhead) than the asymmetric ones. According to [73] session key establishment does
not scale well with the number of vehicles (even with a few vehicles) and soon exceeds
digital signatures in terms of overhead. For scenarios with only few vehicles, the es-
tablishment of session keys for efficiency purposes is not justified because of the lack of
congestion on the wireless channel. In addition, non-repudiation cannot be achieved with
symmetric keys. Hence critical safety applications cannot rely on symmetric session keys .
In [73], it has been shown that pairwise keys result in bigger overhead than ECC even
when there are only a few vehicles; group keys result in saving considerable message
overhead. But group key establishment [70, 73] and membership update require more
messages than the digital signature approach; the actual overhead depends on the num-
ber of vehicles as well as the dynamics of the network. Therefore, symmetric group key
establishment may lead to significant savings in bandwidth consumption but at the ex-
pense of more transmissions and the complexity needed to implement group protocols.
TESLA protocols were found unsuitable for delay-intolerant VANETs [73].
Hence, digital signatures seems to be the most convenient and reliable solution for au-
thentication, even though its efficiency leaves place for improvement. With the hybrid au-
thentication approach, on-board, on-the-fly pseudonym generation and self-certification
is achieved . The use of group signatures, helps reduce the overhead associated with
signatures, handle management issues associated with use of pseudonyms, and provides
a stronger anonymity property than using pseudonyms alone [17].
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5.1.5 Key Management
The management of credentials, both short- and long-term, is undertaken by the CAs
that are also responsible for the revocation of credentials for any node if needed. Public
key operations are performed by the OBU, but all private key operations are performed
by the HSM, which is essentially the trusted computing base of the secure VC system.
Each node has a unique ELP decided by car manufacturers and authorities [73]. Each
ELP is associated with a cryptographic key pair and a set of attributes. The attributes
reflect technical characteristics of the node(e.g., type, dimensions, sensors, and compu-
ting platform), as well as the role of the node in the system. The assignment of an
identity, attributes, and the generation of the certificate are performed oﬄine at the time
the node is registered with the CA.
To obtain pseudonyms, a vehicle V ’s HSM generates a set of key pairs (SK1V , PK1V ) to
(SKnV , PKnV ) and sends the public keys to a corresponding CA via a secured commu-
nication channel [60]. V utilises its long-term identity IDV to authenticate itself to the
CA. The CA signs each of the public keys, PKjV , and generates a set of pseudonyms
for V . Each pseudonym contains an identifier of the CA, the lifetime of the pseudonym,
the public key, and the signature of the CA, and thus, no information about the identity
of the vehicle.
Pseudonyms are stored and managed in the onboard pseudonym pool, with their cor-
responding secret keys kept in the HSM. This ensures that each vehicle has exactly
one key pair (its own pseudonym and private key) that is active during each time
period. Moreover, once the switch from the (SKjV , PKjV ) to the (j + 1)st key pair
(SK(j+1)V , PK(j+1)V ) is made, no further messages can be signed with SKjV , even if
the certificate for PKjV is not yet expired. In other words, pseudonymity cannot be
abused: for example, a rogue vehicle cannot sign multiple beacons, each with a different
SKjV , over a short period, and thus cannot appear as multiple vehicles [60].
Due to the requirement for accountability, the CA archives the issued pseudonyms to-
gether with the vehicle’s long-term identity. In case of an investigation, an authorised
party can ask the CA to reveal the link of a specific pseudonym to the long-term identity
of the vehicle (this leading further to its registered owner).
Certificate Revocation
The advantages of using a PKI for VANETs are accompanied by some challenging pro-
blems, notably certificate revocation. For example, the certificates of a detected attacker
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or malfunctioning device have to be revoked, i.e., it should not be able to use its keys or
if it still does, vehicles verifying them should be made aware of their invalidity. The most
common way to revoke certificates in the case of long-term keys is the distribution of
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) that contain the most recently revoked certificates.
In the case of short-term keys (pseudonyms), since short-lived certificates are used, they
are automatically revoked after a time period. These are the methods proposed in the
IEEE P1609.0 draft standard [6].
But there are several drawbacks in this approach. First, CRLs can be very long due
to the huge number of vehicles and their high mobility. Second, the short lifetime of
certificates still creates a vulnerability window. The challenge is to distribute the CRLs
effectively and efficiently. RSUs distribute CRLs onto vehicles. In areas with no RSUs,
the V2V CRL distribution is initiated by vehicles that were previously in contact with
RSUs. More efficient revocation methods are suggested in [44, 68]:
• RTPD (Revocation protocol of the Tamper-Proof Device): CA revokes all keys of a
vehicle by sending a revocation message to the vehicle. Other VANET participants
do not have to know about the revocation. After receiving the revocation message
HSM of the vehicle erases all keys, sends an acknowledgement to CA, and stops
signing messages. This means no more valid messages can be generated by this
vehicle.
• RCCRL (Revocation protocol using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists): Com-
pressed CRLs (CCRLs) are used if HSM does not send an acknowledgement or if
only a subset of keys should be revoked. It mainly works like an ordinary revoca-
tion list i.e. after receiving a message the recipient has to use the CCRL to check
if the certificate of the sender is valid. To be able to do so the CCRL has to be
distributed in the VANET.
• DRP (Distributed Revocation Protocol): If the neighbours of a vehicle observe
misbehaviour they warn each other not to trust messages of the suspect vehicle. If
there is enough evidence they contact CA that decides if the corresponding vehicle’s
ELP should be revoked permanently. DRP therefore is more a warning protocol
than a revocation protocol.
Revocation lists are assumed to be not that time critical. This holds true as long as nodes
can check plausibility of the warning by means of in-car sensor data (that contains a list
of malicious nodes) [68], verify with messages received from other VANET participants,
and features like DRP are available.
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5.1.6 Privacy and Anonymity
For vehicular ad hoc networks, privacy has been identified to be profoundly important
[24, 41]. In VC it is essential to authenticate senders (by electronic identifiers) and to
advertise sender positions or locations [3]. As we can see from the analysis of privacy
threats in [24], most issues are related to position and vehicle identifier. This involves
either correlating the electronic identifier with a real-world vehicle identity, or by logging
and analysing the relations of various position-identifier pairs to ultimately obtain vehicle
identity (e.g., by associating him with his place of living) .
Since safety messages do not contain any confidential data about their senders, vehicle
owners will be only concerned about identity and location privacy. To respond to these
concerns, [41, 68, 34] proposes the use of anonymous public keys. Signed messages can
be trivially linked to the certificate of the signing node. Therefore, the removal of all in-
formation identifying the user/vehicle from node certificates does make communications
anonymous.
Each private vehicle is equipped with a set of distinct certified anonymous public keys that
do not provide additional identifying information, denoted as pseudonyms [19, 61, 68, 34].
A node utilises the private key corresponding to a pseudonym to sign outgoing messages,
and appends the pseudonym to the messages. Messages signed under the same pseudo-
nym (i.e., using the same corresponding private key) can be trivially linked to each other.
As the vehicle changes pseudonyms, linking messages signed under different pseudonyms
becomes increasingly hard over time and space. In order to preserve the driver’s anony-
mity and minimise the storage costs of public keys, [72] proposes a pseudonym changing
algorithm that adapts to the vehicle speed and takes into account key correlation by the
attacker as described below.
min(Tkey) =
(dv + 2dr)
vt
seconds
where min(Tkey) is the minimum time a pseudonym should be used unchanged, vt is the
vehicle speed, dr is the transmission range, and dv is the distance over which a vehicle
does not change its speed and lane (the vulnerability window with respect to the cor-
relation of keys). Ideally pseudonyms should be changed for every time period slightly
greater than min(Tkey).
The change of a pseudonym should be accompanied by a change of the node identifiers
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like Medium Access Control (MAC), and IP addresses. Otherwise, messages generated
by a node could be trivially linked according to the addresses used by the node’s hard-
ware and software [61]. From the discussions so far, we can arrive at the conclusions
given below [73].
• Identity and location privacy: All vehicle identifiers, in particular MAC and
IP addresses, must change over time. Even though anonymous keys do not contain
any publicly known relationship to the true identity of the key holders, privacy can
still be hijacked by logging the messages containing a given key and thus tracking
the sender until discovering his identity. Therefore, anonymous keys should be
changed in such a way that a pervasive observer cannot track the owner of the
keys.
• Conditional privacy: Privacy preservation is a requirement for deploying vehi-
cular safety applications. But safety and the implied liability requirement have
higher priority. Hence, anonymity should be conditional on the scenario (e.g., if
there are issues of law enforcement or national security, anonymity should be over-
ridden). Hence, the ID disclosure capability should be distributed among multiple
authorities to prevent abuse. For example, police should not be able to retrieve the
identity corresponding to an anonymous key without the permission of a judge.
5.1.7 Secure Communication
Digital signatures are used for secure communication in VANETs [61], and can be used
for all messages. Messages are signed with the private key corresponding to the current
pseudonym . The messages also have a time-stamp, the sender’s clock value, a geo-
stamp, and the sender’s coordinates at the sending time. This mechanism can be applied
to different types of message dissemination: beaconing, restricted flooding (broadcast or
geocast), and position based routing (unicast).
For beaconing, a single signature would suffice. For multihop propagation, depending on
the type of message, the originator appends its signature, while hop-by-hop signatures
can also be added and removed. The latter option, with the combination of signatures,
is also meaningful for securing Position-Based Routing [37].
5.1.8 Secure Positioning
In VC, position is one of the most important data for vehicles. Each vehicle needs to know
not only its own position but also those of other vehicles in its neighbourhood. The most
common approach to positioning vehicles is by GPS. But this has several drawbacks,
because the precision of GPS is to the order of several meters and degrades in urban
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environments because of constructions such as buildings and tunnels that weaken GPS
signals.
GPS can also be subject to a series of attacks such as signal jamming and spoofing.
The authors of [41] propose a method whereby three or more base stations perform dis-
tance bounding on a vehicle before computing its location. The obvious drawback of this
approach is the need for infrastructure coverage. In a different approach presented in
[66], vehicles rebroadcast the public keys of other vehicles after signing them. This helps
to perform relative localisation. A final solution is yet to be formulated for the issue of
secure positioning.
5.1.9 Correctness of Data
It is important to verify the correctness of data (like position information) send by active
safety applications in VANETs. Data is collected by the node from all available sources
(for example the warning system, data that is available from telemetric monitoring and
data extracted from other VANET communication). The collected data is used by every
vehicle to create an independent view of its current status, its current surrounding (phy-
sical) environment and current or previous neighbouring vehicles.
Then, upon the reception of a warning message, the message (its content, origin, etc.
) is evaluated and compared to the vehicle’s own estimation of the current situation,
which results from the previously collected data. Due to the time critical nature of a
warning system, this comparison has to be done in near-real-time, otherwise the warning
information would be useless [52].
5.2 Assumptions
In this section the basic assumptions required for the security and performance analysis
of selected applications are laid down.
5.2.1 Choice of Communication System
5.9 GHz DSRC was the first radio spectrum be allocated for safety applications in United
States [7, 9]. The standardisation of lower layers (802.11p) [4], and the upper layers [6]
was performed by IEEE resulting in the WAVE communication standard. They were de-
veloped with special focus on the priority and time constraints of safety communication
in VANETs
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Ongoing research efforts in the Europe also rely on a similar spectrum band and a Eu-
ropean version of 802.11p [50] for V2V safety communication system. Japan is using a
modified WAVE architecture in their trial stages. For the purpose of performance analy-
sis in this work, a 5.9 GHz DSRC messaging system will be assumed, since it forms the
basis of safety messaging standards worldwide [50].
5.2.2 Vulnerabilities
Here we assume some of the obvious attacks that can be carried out by an attacker, and
that are hard to defend against. The most obvious attack would be jamming attacks
against the wireless channel. This can be carried out by someone inside or outside the
VANET. We also assume that the physical security associated with nodes are trivial, and
that revocation of nodes is not immediate (nodes can contact CA only when it encounters
an RSU). Therefore it is hard to defend against the manipulations in sensor data carried
by a valid sender (malicious node) in the network. Malicious nodes can send false position
and other data to escape accountability in case of accidents. False allegations against
nodes are made by malicious nodes so that valid nodes are revoked from the network.
5.2.3 Basic Safety Messaging Protocol
Safety communications involve periodic broadcast of messages. Depending on the traffic
density conditions we assume the following [72].
• In compliance with the DSRC specifications [7, 9], we assume that each vehicle V
periodically sends messages over a single hop every 300 ms within a range of 10 s
travel time (the minimum range is 110 m and the maximum is 300 m).
• The inter-message interval drops to 100 ms and the range to 15 m if the vehicles
are very slow or stopped (i.e., their speed is less than 10 miles/h or ≈ 16 km/h).
• Vehicles take decisions based on the received messages and may transmit new ones.
For example, if a vehicle V receives an emergency warning from another vehicle W
and, based on their mutual positions, estimates that it is also in danger, it sends
out its own warning messages.
• The minimum data rate for safety communication in DSRC is 6 Mbps (and typically
12 Mbps) [88, 51].
5.2.4 Traffic Scenario
For the purpose of performance analysis, we assume the following traffic scenarios [72].
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• Highway: A highway with 6 lanes (3 in each direction) of 3 m each. We assume
a uniform presence of vehicles, with an inter-vehicle space of 30 m. Vehicles are
mobile and transmit DSRC messages every 300 ms over a 300 m communication
range.
• Congestion: Assuming the same highway as in the previous case but this time
vehicles are very slow or stopped (congestion scenario) and spaced by 5 m (including
the vehicle length). Each vehicle transmits a safety message over a range of 15 m
every 100 ms.
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Authentication Protocols
In this chapter, authentication protocols used for safety messaging in VANETs will be
identified and their performance evaluated against the application requirements listed in
4.4, Table 3.2 and Table 4.1. For the purpose of performance analysis, the following three
protocols that provides common grounds for analysis, are chosen [17, 53, 63]. Before we go
into the analysis of protocols, we will briefly touch upon the network characteristics of a
VANET system that should be considered prior to any study of vehicular communication.
6.1 Network Characteristics
The main challenge for communication in VANETs is the high mobility, the resulting
high rate of topology changes, and the high variability in node density. Typical proto-
cols are hard to apply, e.g. topological routing protocols suffer from outdated neighbour
information [13]. Numerous literature are available that address the effect of mobility on
message delay, throughput, packet losses, probability of reception etc under dense and
sparse traffic conditions. Thus it can be understood that, in VANET communications,
the key component is the movement pattern of vehicles, also called the mobility model.
Mobility models determine the location and speed of nodes in the topology at any gi-
ven instant, which strongly affects network connectivity and throughput. Some of the
mobility models being used are the ones used in NS-2 simulator [1], Manhattan Grid
model [26], and Random Waypoint Model [15]. An accurate analysis outcome requires
a good mobility model that has captured all the aspects of mobility as explained in [56, 45]
Another challenging issue in VANETs is congestion control [87]. In case of congestion,
normally the endpoints detect overload conditions at intermediate nodes and reduces its
data rate. In VANETs, the topology changes within seconds and a congested node used
for forwarding a few seconds ago might not be used at all at the point in time when the
source reacts to the congestion. Broadcasting in a wireless network suffers from a number
of drawbacks [11]. If multiple nodes transmit at the same time, they cause destructive
interference. This is known as a collision of the two messages at the given receiver. Be-
cause the possibility of collision requires each node to retransmit broadcast information
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with a random delay. In spite of this random delay, collisions still occur, and the result
may be a portion of the network not receiving a given broadcast message.
All studies on VANETs assume an optimal coordination of CSMA/CA medium access
[85]. In an actual scenario, the attenuation of a transmitted signal is caused by phe-
nomena like free-space loss (loss in signal strength resulting from a line-of-sight path
through free space, with no obstacles), path loss (which is the attenuation caused by
interferences due to reflections, diffractions or scattering between the radio waves and
the environment) or fading (which is the attenuation caused by the movement of the
environment relative to the sender). This can lead to unexpected strong loss in the
power of the transmitted signal. Radio models are available that estimate these losses
for the purpose of analysis [85]. Deterministic models (e.g. Two Ray Ground) estimate
the average attenuation and predict a fixed attenuation for a given travelled distance.
Probabilistic ones (e.g. Nakagami) are characterised by an attenuation variance, which
estimates the variation over time of the average signal power at travelled distances.
From the discussions above, we can conclude that communication in VANETs are affec-
ted by factors like mobility, signal attenuation, congestion and collision. Any analysis or
simulation of VANET communication should consider these aspects to obtain accurate
results. Owing to the time restrictions associated with the completion of this work, this
thesis does not consider detailed mobility or radio propagation models for protocol ana-
lysis. Nor are any advanced congestion reduction or retransmission schemes considered.
Some of the values [72] used for analysis are derived from simulations done using a NS-2
simulator. The analysis in this thesis will be based on the assumptions made in 5.2.
6.2 Baseline Pseudonyms
A messaging protocol that relies on the concept of pseudonymous authentication, and
termed Baseline Pseudonym (BP) is presented in [17, 63]. Each vehicle generate its own
pseudonyms, in order to eliminate the need of pre-loading, storing and refilling pseudo-
nyms and the corresponding private keys. This way, the burden of key and pseudonym
management is greatly reduced; and so is the cost of obtaining the pseudonyms over off-
line channels (specialised infrastructure, or 3G cellular link downloads). Self-generation
of pseudonyms comes at a higher transmission and processing cost and overheads, which
can be reduced by optimisation.
Each node V is equipped with a set of pseudonyms, which are certified public keys
without any information identifying V. For the ith pseudonym KiV for node V , the CA
provides a certificate CertCA(KiV ), simply a CA signature on the public keyK
i
V (unlike
the X.509 certificates) [17]. The node uses the private key kiV for the pseudonym K
i
V to
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digitally sign messages. To enable message validation, the pseudonym and the certificate
of the signer are attached in each message. With σkiV () denoting V ’s signature under
its ith pseudonym and m the signed message payload, the message format sent by V is:
V −→ ∗ : m, σkiV (m), K
i
V , CertCA(K
i
V )
∗ represents all the message receivers in the communication range of V . On receiving
the message, with the public key of the CA assumed available, receiving node validates
CertCA(KiV ), and then verifies the signature using K
i
V [17]. It makes use of a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL), also assumed to be distributed to vehicles via the infrastructure
[76]. If KiV is not included in the CRL and CA signature on K
i
V is valid, the node
validates σkiV (m) . Each pseudonym is used at most for a period t (pseudonym period)
and then discarded. The CA maintains a map from the long-term identity of V to the
{KiV } set of pseudonyms provided to a node. If presented with a message, the CA can
perform the inverse mapping and identify the signer.
6.3 Group Signature
[53] proposes an authentication protocol based on Group Signatures (GS) for V2V com-
munication. The short group signature scheme that was introduced by Boneh et al. [14],
which is secure and considered to be best suited to the V2V application is considered
in [53]. GS is a stronger property than pseudonymous authentication, as any two group
signatures generated by a node cannot be linked [17].
A verifier can judge whether the signer belongs to a group without knowing who the
signer is in the group. However, in an exceptional situation, the CA can perform an
Open operation [10] and reveal the signer’s identity. Therefore, the group signature tech-
nique brings up a better way to meet the anonymity and traceability requirements rather
than storing all the certificates in the terminal devices [53]. In addition GS scheme re-
quires roles like membership manager (MM) for registering vehicles and assigning private
keys and group public keys, a tracing manager (TM) to reveal ID of vehicles and ability
to selectively revoke the group membership of a compromised vehicle either by updating
keys or releasing revocation lists (RLs) [53].
During the vehicle’s registration process, the MM generates a secret group signing key
gskV , with the group comprising as members all vehicles registered with the MM. A
group public key GPKCA allows for the validation (by any node) of any group signature
SCA,V (m) generated by a group member [53, 17]. A group signature scheme allows any
node V to sign a message on behalf of the group without V ’s identity being revealed to
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the signature verifier. Moreover, it is impossible to link any two signatures of a legitimate
group member. Given a message m, vehicle V signs on m before sending it out. No public
key or other credentials need to be attached to a message anonymously authenticated.
The message format is:
V −→ ∗ : m,ΣCA,V (m)
Once a message is received, the receiver first checks if the time information in the mes-
sage payload is in the allowable time window. If so, the receiving vehicle will perform
signature verification. The short group signature scheme used in [53], is also used in [17].
Hence, for the analysis of [53], the GS computation costs and overheads given in [17] will
be considered.
6.4 Hybrid Scheme
The authentication protocol based on Hybrid Signature (HS) scheme is a combination of
BP and GS schemes [63, 17]. Each node V is equipped with a group signing key gskV
and the group public key GPKCA (total of vehicles registered with the CA). Rather
than generating group signatures to protect messages, a node generates its own set of
pseudonyms (according to the BP public key cryptosystem).
For HS, the CA does not provide a certificate on KiV ; V uses gskV to generate a
group signature SCA,V (KiV ) on each pseudonym K
i
V instead. V attaches ΣCA,V (K
i
V )
to each message, and signs with the corresponding kiV to generate the following message
format [63].
V −→ ∗ : m, σkiV (m), K
i
V ,ΣCA,V (K
i
V )
When a node receives a message, the group signature SCA,V (KiV ) is verified, using
GPKCA. If successful, the receiver infers that a legitimate group member generated
pseudonym KiV . As per the properties of group signatures, the receiver/verifier of the
certificate cannot identify V and cannot link this certificate and pseudonym to any prior
pseudonym used by V . Once the legitimacy of the pseudonym is established, the vali-
dation of σkiV (m) is done. To identify the message signer, an Open operation [10] on the
SCA,V (KiV ) group signature is done; message m is bound to K
i
V via σkiV (m), and K
i
V is
bound to V via SCA,V (KiV )[17].
Optimisations are done to reduce protocol overheads. In the case of optimisation in
HS [17], at the sender side, the SCA,V (KiV ) is computed only once per K
i
V , because
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SCA,V (KiV ) remains unchanged throughout the pseudonym period t. The sender ap-
pends SCA,V (KiV ) to all messages. At the verifier’s side the SCA,V (K
i
V ) is validated
upon the first reception and stored. For all subsequent receptions, if SCA,V (KiV ) has
already been verified, the receiver skips its validation. Optimised HS will be considered
for performance analysis.
6.5 Performance Analysis
Primarily, the two scenarios, highway and congestion, introduced in 5.2 will be consi-
dered for performance analysis. The different parameter values of both scenarios are
given in Table 6.1, derived from [72]. Value of message sizs are chosen to correspond to
a maximum message size of 1100 bytes, as per the message range chosen in [72]. The
minimum DSRC channel capacity of 6 Mbps for safety messages will be considered. The
following parameters are defined for further use in performance analysis.
m =total message size (bytes)
s = safety message size (bytes)
o = cryptographic overheads (bytes)
T = System throughput (bytes per second)
n = number of vehicles in transmission range (number of messages received per beacon)
r = messaging rate (beacons per second) per vehicle
l = maximum allowable latency/beaconing interval (ms)
d = maximum tolerable processing delay per message (ms)
In both scenarios, as explained in [72], vehicles are mobile and transmit DSRC mes-
sages every l ms over the communication range. Considering a vehicle V located in the
middle of the highway, which corresponds to a maximum of received messages; V can
hear n vehicles per l ms. In the worst-case, where all vehicles contend for the channel,
the system throughput is T , assuming the minimum nominal capacity of DSRC, which
is 6 Mbps. Before V can send a new message, it should be able to process all incoming
messages within l ms. It is assumed that V receives all the n messages (although the
average reception rate [86] is smaller than 1, upper bound is assumed).
In a highway scenario, considering a single lane and a transmission range of 300 m,
a vehicle in the centre of traffic will hear 10 vehicles/messages (transmission range di-
vided by inter vehicle distance) from the front and 10 vehicles/messages from the rear
(total 20 in each lane), per beacon. For six lanes, no of vehicles can be calculated as
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n = 20× 6 = 120. Similarly, in a congestion scenario, n = 36 and r = 10 [72]. This has
been calculated assuming a vehicle hears all traffic in its range (upper bounds).
Parameters Highway
scenario
Congestion
scenario
Vehicle speed (miles/hour) > 10 ≤ 10
Messaging rate (beacons/second) 3.33 10
Messaging range 300 15
Maximum tolerable latency (ms) 300 100
Inter vehicle distance 30 5
Message size (bytes) 100, 200, 300,
400, 500, 600,
700, 800
100, 200, 300,
400, 500, 600,
700, 800
Radio system 5.9 GHz DSRC 5.9 GHz DSRC
Usable DSRC bandwidth (Mbps) 6 6
Number of lanes 6 6
Number of messages received 120 per 300 ms 36 per 100 ms
Table 6.1: Traffic scenario parameters and values
Since the chosen protocols need PKI and Group Signatures (GS) for implementing se-
curity in VANETs, it is important to choose a Public Key Cryptosystem (PKCS) and
GS with an acceptable implementation overhead in the vehicular context. For the pur-
pose of performance analysis in this chapter, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA1) [2] and the group signature (GS) proposed by Boneh and Shacham [14] will
be used (Table 6.2). These are the primitives used for cryptographic operations in BP,
GS and HS [17, 53, 63].
Algorithm Security
level (bits)
Signing
time (ms)
Verification
time (ms)
Signature
(bytes)
Public key
(bytes)
ECDSA-192 80 0.5 3 48 25
ECDSA-256 128 3 4.2 64 33
GS 80 17.8 15.6 151 278
GS 128 53.7 49.3 225 800
Table 6.2: Signature algorithms - computation costs and overheads
According to DSRC, safety-related messages are sent with a periodicity of 100 to 300 ms.
This imposes an upper bound on the processing time overhead; this overhead is given as
follows [72]:
Toh(M) = Tsign(M) + Ttx(M |SigPrKV [M ]) + Tverify(M) (1)
1http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/P1363a/index.html
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where Tsign(M), Ttx(M |SigPrKV [M ]), and Tverify(M) are the necessary durations to
sign, transmit, and verify a message M , respectively. From expression (1), we see that
processing overhead depends on signing and verification of signatures. It is safe to as-
sume that the critical processing overhead of a given PKCS is the signature verification
time, since each vehicle will periodically receive several messages that it needs to verify
while it has to sign and send only one message during the same period [72].
6.5.1 Computation Cost
All measurements were made on a Centrino machine with the clock speed set at 1.5 GHz;
this is a close approximation for the CVIS2 vehicle PC. For cryptographic primitives, the
individual delays are shown for each operation in Table 6.2. The values in Table 6.2 will
be followed for subsequent analysis in this section. The security levels (t) are assumed
to be t = 80 bits for message signatures (svkiV (m)) in BP and t = 128 bits for certificate
signatures in BP and GS (CertCA(KiV ) and SCA,V (m) respectively). The assumption is
that high security is not necessary for the short-lived pseudonym in BP, although it is
required for the long-term GS keys [17, 63].
For BP, a sender computes a svkiV (m) for each message, and each receiver will validate
one svkiV (m) per message and one CertCA(K
i
V ) for each pseudonym [17]. From Table 6.2,
the costs per message will be: 0.5 ms/message for signing, and 7.2 ms/message (3 ms to
verify for verification of svkiV (m) and 4.2 ms to verify certificate CertCA(K
i
V )). For GS,
each vehicle will need to generate and verify one SCA,V (m) per message, either trans-
mitted or received. This costs around 53.7 ms/message for signing and 49.3 ms/message
for verification [17, 53].
In HS, the cost is one svkiV (m) generation and verification per message and one Cert
H
CA(K
i
V )
generation and verification per pseudonym. The costs are 54.2 ms/message for signing
(0.5 ms to generate svkiV (m) and 53.7 ms to generate Cert
H
CA(K
i
V )), and 52.3 ms/message
for verification (3 ms to verify svkiV (m) and 49.3 ms to verify Cert
H
CA(K
i
V )). Considering
optimisation, we assume t = 60s. For HS, due to optimisation, we also have to take into
account the highway and congestion scenarios to calculate the computing and message
overheads [17].
Highway scenario: In this case r = 3.33, and t = 60s. During the pseudonym per-
iod, vehicle issues 60× 3.33≈200 messages. The signing costs include 54.2 ms/message
for signing (0.5 ms to generate svkiV (m) and 53.7 ms to generate Cert
H
CA(K
i
V )) the first
2The CVIS project, http://www.cvisproject.org/
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message in the pseudonym period and 0.5 ms/message (0.5 ms to generate svkiV (m))
for the rest of the 200 messages till t has expired. The verifying costs include 52.3
ms/message for verifying (3 ms to verify svkiV (m) and 49.3 ms to verify Cert
H
CA(K
i
V )) the
first message in the pseudonym period and 3 ms/message (3 ms to verify svkiV (m)) for the
rest of the 200 messages. Therefore, average signing cost per message during t is ((0.5
+ 53.7)+(0.5×199 messages))/(200 messages) ≈0.8 ms. Average verifying cost is ((3 +
49.3)+(3×199 messages))/(200 messages) ≈3.25 ms.
Congestion scenario: Here r = 10, and t = 60s. During the pseudonym period, ve-
hicle issues 60× 10 =600 messages. Average signing cost per message during t is ((0.5
+ 53.7)+(0.5×599 messages))/(600 messages) ≈0.6 ms. Average verifying cost is ((3 +
49.3)+(3×599 messages))/(600 messages) ≈3.1 ms. The computation costs for BP, GS
and optimised HS are displayed in Table 6.3.
Authentication scheme Signing
time (ms)
Verification
time (ms)
Message
overhead (bytes)
BP 0.5 3 137
GS 17.8 15.6 225
HS optimised (highway scenario) 0.8 3.25 298
HS optimised (congestion scenario) 0.6 3.1 298
Table 6.3: Processing costs for authentication schemes
6.5.2 Cryptographic Overhead
Cryptographic overhead is the additional data in bytes that is added to the original mes-
sage due to cryptographic operations. The message overheads for different authentication
schemes are given in Table 6.3 [17]. For BP, KiV and CertCA(K
i
V ) are 89 bytes. Along
with svkiV (m) (48 bytes (Table 6.2)), the overhead is 137 bytes per message. For GS, the
overhead is SCA,V (m) (225 bytes per message (Table 6.2)). For Hybrid, the overhead is
svkiV
(m), KiV and CertCA(K
i
V ), in total 298 bytes per message [17].
6.5.3 Total Message Size vs. Throughput
The system throughput in the case of a VANET can be defined as the bandwidth cur-
rently demanded by vehicular communication in the communication channel. It can be
calculated as follows [72].
T =
n× r ×m× 8
1024× 1024 Mbps
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(2)
The total message size m = s + o. For e.g. in BP m=s+137 bytes (Table 6.2). In
GS scheme, the overhead m=s+225 bytes. In Hybrid scheme, m = s + 298 bytes [17].
To analyse the effect of message size on throughput, different message sizes has been
chosen (Table 6.1). The different values of s are substituted in equation 2 for highway
(n=120, r=3.33) and congestion (n=36, r=10) scenarios. Table 6.4 gives the different
throughput values (equation 2) for different message sizes under different authentication
schemes .
Message size (s)
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Throughput (Mbps)
(BP, highway scenario)
0.72 1 1.33 1.63 1.94 2.24 2.55 2.85
Throughput (Mbps)
(GS, highway scenario)
0.99 1.29 1.6 1.9 2.21 2.51 2.82 3.12
Throughput (Mbps)
(HS, highway scenario)
1.21 1.51 1.82 2.12 2.43 2.73 3.04 3.34
Throughput (Mbps)
(BP, congestion
scenario)
0.65 0.92 1.2 1.47 1.74 2.02 2.2 2.57
Throughput (Mbps)
(GS, congestion
scenario)
0.89 1.16 1.44 1.71 1.99 2.26 2.54 2.81
Throughput (Mbps)
(HS, congestion
scenario)
1.09 1.36 1.64 1.91 2.19 2.46 2.74 3.01
Table 6.4: Message size vs. System throughput for different authentication protocols
From Table 6.4 can be seen that the throughput increases linearly with message size. Sa-
fety message sizes are of the order of 100-500 bytes [88, 82, 53, 77, 68, 8]. Assuming HS
(maximum overhead≈300), a maximum message size of 500 bytes (total message size of
800 bytes) and highway scenario (this scenario demands the maximum throughput), the
throughput is 3.35 Mbps. This is well below the minimum 6 Mbps wireless bandwidth
of DSRC even assuming upper bounds. Hence, as far as throughput is concerned, the
three protocols work well for the selected applications.
In practical scenarios, the throughput does not increase linearly with message size. One
of the reasons is that with increase in message size, there is a drop in number of messages
received. [72] shows by simulation that for a total message size of 800 bytes (message
size=500 bytes, assuming HS), messages received per second (n × r) is 75 for highway
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scenario and 60 messages per second for congestion scenario, which is well below the
value of n in Table 6.1 . With these values of n × r, the throughput of HS calculated
from equation (2) becomes 0.46 Mbps (highway scenario) and 0.37 Mbps (congestion
scenario). Thus we can see that practical values are much less than the upper bound
calculated in Table 6.4.
There is a drastic drop (roughly 20-25 messages/sec for every 100 byte increase in total
message size) in the number of received messages after 300 bytes, and it slowly stabi-
lises with increase in message size until 1000 bytes [72]. At the same time throughput
increases drastically with message size until 300 bytes, after which it stabilises until 1000
bytes . Considering the selected applications in Table 3.2, we see that the minimum
message size varies from 35-60 bytes. Assuming a safety message size of 100 bytes [53, 8],
BP gives a total message size of 237 bytes, GS gives 325 bytes and HS gives a total mes-
sage size of 398 bytes. Hence HS has maximum impact on message losses and throughput.
From the simulation results in [72], we see that a total message size of 100-300 bytes
is ideal for safety messaging (drastic message losses after 300 bytes). HS already has an
overhead of 298 bytes, and the total message size will easily exceed 300 bytes. For a
given message size, the best option for authentication scheme to minimise message losses
and reduce throughput is BP.
6.5.4 Total Message Size vs. Message Delay
Message delay is the time taken to deliver the message from sender to receiver. According
to [72], the average message delay does not vary considerably when the message size
increases because the low contention on the medium and the high transmission rate
minimise the effect of the message size. In different scenarios, the maximum message
delay incurred can be roughly estimated as follows [72].
Total message size
(bytes)
Maximum message delay
(ms) (highway scenario)
Maximum message delay
(ms) (congestion
scenario)
100 20 20
200 30 30
300 40 42
400 42 50
500 50 52
600 60 48
700 50 48
800 50 48
Table 6.5: Message size vs. Message delay
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Table 6.3 was compiled for digital signatures using ECDSA (28 bytes) [72]. From a
total message size of 300-400 bytes, the average message delay does not vary much, in
both scenarios. Considering the applications listed in Table 3.2, the maximum allowable
latency is 20 ms for pre-crash sensing and 100 ms for other applications (lane change,
cooperative forward collision warning, electronic break lights). Referring to Table 6.5,
in both scenarios, the average message delay corresponds to 20 ms which is the upper
bound for latency in pre-crash sensing.
For pre-crash sensing, assuming a message size of 100 bytes [8, 53] and overhead of
137 bytes (BP), the total message size goes to 237 bytes. From Table 6.5 this corres-
ponds to a maximum message delay of between 30 and 40 ms (we can assume more or
less the same delay as BP uses ECDSA signature (48 bytes)). According to the applica-
tion requirements of pre-crash sensing the maximum allowable latency cannot go above
20 ms. The use of even BP with pre-crash sensing for authentication becomes really
challenging. Lower message sizes and smaller signature sizes will have to be considered
for pre-crash sensing. Other authentication schemes (GS and HS) are associated with
even more message delays due to larger total message sizes (larger signature sizes).
For other applications in Table 3.2, the maximum allowable latency is 100ms. The
values given in Table 6.5 falls well below this upper bound. Assuming similar message
delay values for BP, GS and HS, these schemes can be used for the three remaining
applications in Table 3.2.
6.5.5 Messaging Rate vs. Processing Delay
Processing delay per message can be defined as the time taken by a vehicle to verify each
message it receives. The processing delay varies with the messaging rate as shown below
[72].
d =
l
n
• Highway scenario: In this case latency=300 ms and number of vehicles n=120
(Table 6.1). Therefore maximum tolerable processing delay=300/120=2.5 ms.
Now, each vehicle has maximum 2.5 ms to process a message between consecu-
tive messages.
• Congestion scenario: Here latency=100 ms and number of vehicles n=36. The-
refore maximum tolerable processing delay=100/36=2.78 ms. Each vehicle has
maximum of 2.78 ms to process a message.
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From the table, for BP, GS and HS (highway) schemes, the overheads are 3 ms, 15.6 ms
and 3.25 ms, which is above the maximum tolerable delay (here e have assumed vehicles
receive all messages from neighbours). GS is nowhere close to being used for the selected
applications. In real life scenarios, a vehicle won’t hear all the neighbours in it’s range
because of losses [86]. From the simulation in [72], it can be understood that the ave-
rage actual processing delays for a total message of size 800 bytes are around 1s/75msg
= 13.33 ms in highway scenario and 1s/60msg = 16.67 ms in congestion scenario. For
message sizes between 100-300 bytes, it is 5.5 ms and 8 ms for highway and congestion
scenarios respectively. Referring to Table 6.3, it can be seen that the verification times
of BP and HS are well below those of 800 bytes and 10-300 bytes. GS falls on the border
of upper bound verification value for 800 bytes, and needs faster algorithms or faster
platforms to support lower message sizes (100-300 bytes) .
Another very promising candidate for PKCS in BP and HS is NTRU3 [72]. It gives
a signing time of 1.587 ms and verification time of 1.488 ms, calculated on a Pentium II
platform (Table 6.2 calculations are based on a Centrino 1.5 GHz platform). Thus it can
be noticed that NTRU signatures meet the maximum tolerable processing delay requi-
rements, and will perform even better on modern platforms. BP, HS are authentication
schemes that can be comfortably used for applications listed in Table 3.2. The signature
verification delay associated with GS makes it unsuitable for safety-critical communica-
tion (until GS algorithms that can be compute faster or faster platforms than Centrino
1.5 GHz are available). Processors faster than Centrino 1.5 GHz are already available in
market.
6.6 Security Analysis
To do a security analysis of the protocols identified in 6.1, we refer to the VANET ap-
plications identified in Table 4.1. In BP, GS and HS, the authentication of the sender is
done by verifying the sender signature using sender public key (pseudonymKiV in HP and
BP, group public key GPKCA in GS). Use of digital signatures provide authentication
and integrity, and prevents masquerade attacks. The public key does not give any ID
information of sender, but is certified by the CA, which in turn authenticates the sender
public key. Assuming the property identification of sender is included in the certificate
provided by CA, property authentication of the message can be provided. None of the
protocols (BP, GS or HS) provides location authentication; there is no way to verify if
the received location information is correct.
Entity authentication is provided by the time stamps included in the message signa-
3http://www.ntru.com/
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ture. Time stamps used with signatures in messages guarantees message freshness and
provide protection against replay attacks. In BP, GS and HS, since the ID of any sender
is not revealed in the public keys, it is not possible to trace ID of the vehicle or the
owner. In BP, pseudonyms are changed frequently in a way that no two messages signed
by different pseudonyms can be linked. Pseudonyms do not provide privacy if vehicle
is in a monitored area [16]. GS provides a stronger version of privacy where any two
group signatures by a node cannot be linked. Hence GS protocol provides stronger ID
privacy than BP or HS. Ideally, applications require the privacy of GS and efficiency of
BP. Auditability can be provided in the case of these three protocols, by approaching the
CA who links the public key to ELP and the ELP can be linked to the owner of the vehicle.
If a node sends a forged message (with false position or false sensor values), BP, HS
and GS do not provide methods to detect it. Integrity only provides a way of detecting
the changes in data during message transit. Availability of the system is something that
cannot be fully guaranteed. The primary vulnerability lies in wireless channel open to
jamming attacks. DoS attacks against individual nodes can be realised by sending too
many messages to it, giving it not enough time to process valid messages. Availability
is determined to a great extent by the secure routing protocols in VANETs, securing
and guaranteeing message delivery to destination. Detection and prevention of DoS also
requires mechanisms like intrusion detection and prevention. The physical security of
HSM is the underlying factor that ensures the valid use of keys. Without an adequately
protected HSM, keys can be compromised.
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As we have seen, the large number of nodes, high vehicle speeds, rapidly changing topo-
logy, varying node densities, and low message latencies are the main factors that shape
the performance of a VANET. In this thesis, vehicular applications were classified, the
importance of security in safety-critical applications were explained and the security ar-
chitecture of safety-critical applications were elaborated. The main intent of the thesis
was to study the impact of cryptographic overheads, total message size, and messaging
rate on efficiency of secure communication protocols, for V2V safety-critical applications..
7.1 Contributions
In Chapter 6, apart from the applications selected in Table 32, three authentication
protocols (BP, GS and HS) were also selected for analysis and their cryptographic com-
putation costs and overheads were noted. In HS, the computation costs and overheads
varies with messaging rate and pseudonym lifetime. Hence, assuming pseudonym life-
time = 60 s, computation costs and overheads were calculated for HS; in highway and
congestion scenarios. The whole idea was to identify the ideal communication parameters
for safety-critical applications and to study the suitability of BP, GS and HS protocols.
From the analysis of these protocols conducted in Chapter 6, the following conclusions
were reached.
• The optimum total message size for safety-critical applications should be between
100 and 300 bytes in order to ensure optimum communication system perfor-
mance.
• For the ideal total message size of 100-300 bytes, the maximum tolerable mes-
sage processing delay was found to be 5.5 ms for highway scenario and 8 ms for
congestion scenario.
• Any authentication protocol that has a total message size between 100 and 300
bytes and does signature verification in 5.5 ms (highway scenario) and 8 ms (conges-
tion scenario) is an ideal candidate for safety-critical applications.
• To support all safety-critical applications (Table 3.2), there should be an average
message delay of less than 20 ms for the ideal total message size of 100-300 bytes.
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• It is meaningless to have sender authentication and not have data authentication
(verification of position data and other sensor data) for safety-critical applications.
7.1.1 Total Message Size
• The optimum total message size for safety-critical applications should be between
100 and 300 bytes in order to ensure optimum communication system perfor-
mance.
In the analysis of protocols on Chapter 6, it was noticed that the actual number of
messages received per second by a node is less than 50% of the theoretical value (400
messages/sec for highway and 360 messages/sec for congestion). Nodes receive maximum
messages in both scenarios, when the total message size is 100-300 bytes, and after that
the reception rate drops drastically. The average message delay increases from a minimum
of 20 ms at 100 bytes until 400 bytes, in both scenarios, and stabilises at 50 ms after 400
bytes. Similarly message throughput increases from 100 bytes to 400 bytes and stabilises
afterwards. The maximum possible throughput is still 0.5 Mbps, well below DSRC
minimum of 6 Mbps. From these observations, it can be inferred that the ideal total
message size for safety-critical applications should be between 100 and 300 bytes in
order to ensure maximum reception, minimum message delay and minimum throughput.
7.1.2 Message Processing Delay
• For the ideal total message size of 100-300 bytes, the maximum tolerable mes-
sage processing delay was found to be 5.5 ms for highway scenario and 8 ms for
congestion scenario.
In highway scenario, for the total message size of 100-300 bytes, the total messages
received/node/sec is 180, which is the maximum reception. [72]. Similarly it is 125 in
congestion scenario. Therefor maximum processing delay is 1/180=5.55 ms and 1/125=8
ms for highway and congestion scenarios respectively.
7.1.3 Message Delay:
• To support all safety-critical applications, there should be an average message delay
of less than 20 ms for the ideal total message size of 100-300 bytes.
For both highway and congestion scenarios, in Table 6.5, the minimummessage delay is 20
ms. This makes the communication system unsuitable for pre-crash sensing application
identified in Table 3.2, which has a maximum allowable latency of only 20 ms, and
demands a latency less than this upper limit. This means for a feasible total message
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size between 100-300 bytes, we should have a message delay less than 20 ms to support
applications like pre-crash sensing. The message delay can be brought down by reducing
message size or by using improved wireless media access schemes [89]. For the other
applications in Table 3.2, the message delay stays well below their maximum tolerable
latency (100 ms) for 100-300 bytes.
7.1.4 Performance Analysis:
• Any authentication protocol that has a total message size between 100 and 300
bytes and does signature verification in 5.5 ms (highway scenario) and 8 ms (conges-
tion scenario) is an ideal candidate for safety-critical applications.
From the performance analysis of the three protocols, for GS and HS itself, the crypto-
graphic overheads are 225 bytes and 298 bytes respectively. This means that for even
the minimum of safety message sizes, total message sizes in GS and HS touch the upper
limit (300 bytes) of optimum total message size. This affects system performance. In
the case of BP, optimum system performance can be obtained upto 160 bytes of message
payload. Considering message processing delay, BP and HS (in both scenarios) meet the
maximum tolerable message processing delay constraints (Table 6.3). GS, taking into
account the Centrino 1.5 GHz platform and algorithm [14] under consideration, does not
meet the processing delay constraints. GS could meet the requirements if it works on
a signature algorithm and/or platform that provides computation capabilities at least 4
times faster than what is considered in the thesis. The preferred protocols in this case
are BP and HS. BP and HS can work better on faster signature algorithms like NTRU.
7.1.5 Security Analysis
• It is meaningless to have sender authentication and not have data authentication
(verification of position data and other sensor data) for safety-critical applications.
In security analysis, it was noticed that BP, GS or HS could not provide location au-
thentication (verifying sender location) and availability to the applications identified in
Table 4.1. Therefore, applications remain vulnerable to attacks like forgery and worm-
hole, due to the inability of nodes to verify received information. But the protocols
provide properties like authentication, integrity, entity authentication, id privacy and
auditability. The anonymous public key (signed by the CA) is used by the receiver to
authenticate the sender, and provides privacy, as vehicle details are not present in the
certificate. Pseudonyms (BP and HS) [16] do not provide the strong privacy offered by
GS. Auditability is provided when upon request from proper authorities, the CA maps
the anonymous public key to the vehicle ELP. Registration authorities then map ELP to
the vehicle owner.
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7.2 Open Issues
These involve the issues that were identified in the analysis of protocols in Chapter 6.
Solution to these issues either require a different approach towards solution or are topics
of ongoing research efforts. These issues need to be addressed for a VANET system to
be successfully tested and deployed.
7.2.1 Assumptions
For protocol analysis, the mobility patterns that were assumed were very simple; vehicles
moving in same direction, with the same speed, always separated by same distance,
broadcasting at the same time. Practically vehicles move in same an opposite directions,
at different speeds, maintain different spacing between them, change lanes and broadcast
randomly. In an ideal scenario, for purpose of analysis and simulation, a practical VANET
mobility model has to be considered along with a suitable radio propagation model [86],
that can be validated. This will give more accurate results for the analysis compared to
simple assumptions.
7.2.2 Flexibility
With improvement in technology, protocols and cryptographic primitives change. Since
VANET applications are delay sensitive and bandwidth constrained, such improvements
in technology demand fast implementations, as they will considerably improve VANET
performance. It is important that nodes have the facility to quickly switch and adapt to
new technologies, unlike other wireless applications.
7.2.3 Sensor Manipulation
Assuming the HSM is tamper resistant, safety of private keys are assured. But it doesn’t
prevent the manipulation of sensor data (like speed, throttle position, position etc) by
owner to disseminate false data into the VANET. This could be for malicious purposes
or to avoid accountability after a hit and run. As long as the data authentication feature
is not available in VANETs, manipulation of sensor data can cause serious issues.
7.2.4 Privacy
The considered mechanisms for authentication and privacy in this thesis are BP, GS and
HS. However, the BP mechanism has some limitations. It might still be possible to fully
track vehicles between pseudonym changes [16]. Increasing the frequency of changes can
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help, but also increases the incurred overhead. Group signatures are a promising; but
require faster signature algorithms and platforms, as explained in 7.1.4. Research efforts
should address attacks against privacy at any layer of the communication stack [46].
7.2.5 Revocation
The problems with malicious nodes is that they launch attacks in the VANET system
and can cause revocation of benign nodes. As long as vehicles get live updates from
surrounding nodes on malicious nodes, certificate revocation of malicious nodes is not
time-critical. In the absence of such a mechanism, the revocation of malicious nodes
from the network become time-critical, since they need to be removed from the network
before they can wreak more havoc in the system. Main issue facing revocation is that
fact that nodes are not in continuous communication with CA. Details on some of the
current research addressing this topic are available in [75, 58, 74]
7.2.6 Data Verification
We should not only verify that the sender of the data is legitimate, but also that the
data in itself is legitimate (e.g., safety warnings, traffic information, their freshness and
location relevance). Wrong data leads to attacks, failure of VANET applications and
possibly accidents. Even though the sender of the data may not necessarily be malicious,
but vehicle’s sensors may be malfunctioning. Trying to interact with possibly adversarial
(faulty) data senders to determine their trustworthiness is hard: encounters are in general
short-lived and have no prior associations. Dedicated research is going on to address
verification of position information and other data (speed, acceleration etc) in MANETs
[35, 78, 33, 83].
7.2.7 Availability
Challenges to availability can cause users to lose confidence in the system. The avai-
lability of a VANET system is challenged at all layers; jamming at physical layer, DoS
attacks at MAC and upper layers. VANETs use complex information dissemination me-
thodologies like efficient flooding, context-adaptive message dissemination, as well as
data aggregation which are essentially efficient and secure means of routing information
[80, 71]. Denial of service (DoS) is still possible, in-spite of the presence of cryptogra-
phic security mechanisms higher layer protocols. Detection and prevention (rate checks,
consistency checks etc) of intrusions in VANETs is explored in [81].
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7.2.8 Non-Technical Aspects
The biggest problem with VANETs is the sheer size of it; assuming worldwide and total
adoption, a vehicular network would have millions off nodes. Such a network should
have a very low tolerance for errors, and would also be a heterogeneous network at large
(different countries will follow different standards, infrastructure, laws and implementa-
tions). Coordination in such a network is difficult to be achieved, for example, in the
case of PKI. Law enforcement agencies would like to have total access to the transmit-
ted information (e.g. to immediately fine violators of speed limits), while drivers would
surely reject that. Also, initially only a small number of vehicles are expected to be part
of such networks, making safety or other applications less effective [84].
7.3 Future Work
This work focused on finding the optimum total message length, average message delay
and maximum processing delay for safety-critical applications, identified as the perfor-
mance requirements of VANET messaging system. Secure communication protocols were
chosen to analyse, apart from their security aspects, their suitability in adhering to the
performance requirements mentioned above. Owing to the time constraints, the per-
formance and security analysis of protocols were conducted based on observations in
previous works [72].
The future work in this line would include identifying suitable mobility and radio pro-
pagation models for highway and congestion scenarios, and conducting simulations to
understand the impact of total message size on message delay, throughput and message
reception. Based on these simulation values, we can arrive at the optimum total message
size and minimum processing delay for V2V safety-critical applications. Moreover the
performance of communication protocols used for applications like platooning, having
multiple protocol runs, can be analysed.
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